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Abstract
The  existence  of  text  types  in  discourse  is  a  topic  often  debated  by text  linguists.
Generally  speaking,  existing  models  concerning  these  notion  units  of  language  are
explicitly  functional  or  formalist  in  their  theoretical  basis.  While  most  of  these
approaches to text types are valuable in their own right, the tendency is to view text
types as discrete structural units of discourse. In this way, very little attention has been
paid to the way in which these structural groupings interact with one another at the level
of discourse. The richest of these models is to be found in Carlota Smith's  Modes of
Discourse.  However,  while  the  conclusions  drawn  by  Smith  are  far-reaching  and
applicable,  her  work  finds  its  foundations  in  the  explicitly  formalist  approach  to
discourse comprehension known as Discourse Representation Theory. 
This thesis wishes to argue that this reliance on DRT greatly hinders the potential of
Smith's discourse typology. As such, the goal of this work is to re-appropriate Smith's
work  within  a  model  more  in  line  with  current  research  in  the  field  of  Cognitive
Linguistics. In particular this thesis seeks to present a syncretic model based around
three key theoretical frameworks – Cognitive Grammar,  Mental  Spaces  Theory,  and
Relevance Theory. In doing so, we find that text types can be defined from a strictly
cognitive  perspective,  and  that  doing  so  greatly  increases  the  value  of  a  structural
typology of discourse above the level of the sentence. While this thesis is primarily
geared towards a high-level synthesis  of theoretical frameworks, some short worked
examples serve as heuristic aids indicative of the potential applications of the theory
being developed.
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Introduction
The notion of text types in written discourse is not one which commonly finds much favour in
linguistic circles. This thesis argues that the existence of text types in discourse can be justified by
way of  existing linguistic  theories  of  language use at  the level  of  the sentence.  Moreover,  the
primary thrust of this work concerns the following statement: it is not just that such a typology can
be  constructed  from  basic  principles  but  that  the  text  types  so  defined  are  best  viewed  as
functionally salient structures at the level of discourse.
In this way, the focus of this thesis is mainly upon theoretical development of a text type
framework from the bottom up. Of course, in order to do this, we must first answer – what exactly
is meant by text type? As with theoretical linguistics more generally, this answer lacks one clear and
definitive answer. Arguably, text types find their earliest formulation in Aristotle's Rhetoric, and the
distinction between  logos,  ethos,  and  pathos which (very)  roughly correlate  to  three aspects of
persuasion, respectively: truth and logic; the ethical dimension; and emotional effect.  As with much
of Aristotle's thought, this tripartite formulation of rhetorical text types continues to find near direct
correlates in more contemporary thought. In particular, these ideas were reintroduced to the study of
English in Alexander Bain's (1866/1898) English Composition and Rhetoric. In this, Bain sets out
four rhetorical modes of discourse – Narrative, Description, Exposition, and Argumentation.  This
grouping  represents  the  structural  grouping  of  text  types  most  commonly considered  standard.
Rhetorical models such as these place emphasis on language as used as a persuasive tool. 
A number of differing methodologies have been employed by those who approach text types
from a primarily functional or narratological standpoint. Consider, for example, Kinneavy (1971)
and  Longacre  (1983),  who rely heavily on  complex notions  of  temporal  arrangement  in  texts.
Advancing  these  notions  and  echoing  Genette  (1980),  Monika  Fludernik's  (1996)  Towards  a
Natural Narratology represents a great leap forward in the structural study of narrative. In keeping
with a pluralistic, interdisciplinary ethos Fludernik notes that her framework is not the final say in
the matter  of text  types,  opening the possibility for the revision of categories 'in any way that
linguists find corresponds with their material' (2000: 281).
Text types have received varying degrees of attention by text linguists. In these cases, the
notion  of  types  has  tended  to  be  viewed  in  a  rather  minimal  way:  representing  a  means  of
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categorizing and describing structural features present in texts. A particularly relevant early attempt
at such organization is to be found in the work of Egon Werlich's (1976) Text Grammar of English.
Werlich's analysis derives from a qualitative analysis of various linguistic properties, with text types
categorized relative to a fairly small subset of essentially grammatical features. Werlich concludes
on  this  basis  that  the  five  basic  text  types  are  Narration,  Report, Description,  Information,
Argumentation,.
The fine grained focus on the linguistic detail of text types is a great strength of Werlich's
approach; it is perhaps a pity that his work has not received more mainstream recognition. However,
his research ethos finds adoption and continuation in the detailed quantitative analyses of Douglas
Biber (1988, 1989). Biber's corpus linguistic approach seeks to categorize text types on account of
statistical  clustering  of  lexicogrammatical  features  from existing  discourse.  However,  Werlich's
commitment  to  qualitative  analysis  married  with  fine  grain  linguistic  detail  finds  an  extended
correlate  in  Carlota  Smith's  (2003)  Modes  of  Discourse.  The  basic  structural  configuration  of
Smith's  modes  derives  from  properties  which  are  distinctly  grammatical  rather  than  lexical.
Specifically,  her  approach  rests  on  the  inherent  properties  of  tense  and  aspect;  of  the  various
situation types introduced into the discourse universe; the phenomenon of subjectivity; and surface
structure  presentation,  a  notion  borrowed  from  Prague  School  Functionalism.  Based  on  the
intertwining of  these properties,  Smith  notes  five  basic  modes:  Narrative,  Report,  Description,
Information, and Argumentation. Discourse modes are not to be confused with genre as such, where
genre is understood as a socially and stylistically marked mode of discourse (as in Steen 2002; cf
also Fairclough 2003). Thus, I consider some typical instances of genre to be literary narratives,
newspaper articles, blog posts, academic writing, popular science, and so on. Despite the potentially
confusing nomenclature, the categories can be distinguished by observing that genres are higher-
level  structures,  whereas  discourse  modes  are  smaller  structural  units  of  organization.  Thus,
discourse generally and genres specifically are 'built up' from discourse modes.
Smith's theory of the modes of discourse has an intuitive appeal. With its particular focus on
the lexicogrammatical properties of a text, this method allows for a detailed qualitative analysis to
be carried out to a considerable degree of depth on a purely linguistic basis. By emphasising the
crucial importance of tense, aspect, and situation types in the structuring and comprehension of text,
Smith's discourse modes fits alongside other text-driven approaches such as Text World Theory
(Werth  1999;  Gavins  2006);  Contextual  Frame  Theory  (Emmott  1997);  and  even  those
narratological approaches mentioned above such as Genette (1980) and Fludernik (1996). In this
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way, Smith's theory emphasises the role of discourse modes in the processing of text and meaning
construction. Thus, discourse modes can be said to go beyond a strictly structural typology, moving
towards a conceptualization of discourse modes as functional text types. As such, I consider Smith's
discourse  modes  to  represent  a  particularly  fruitful  approach  to  text  types  worthy  of  further
attention.  
However,  it  was  noted  above  that  Smith's  discourse  modes  are  on  their  way  to  being
functional text types. As it stands, I do not consider this goal to have been fully realized. Smith's
work derives a great deal of its theoretical impetus from the work of Hans Kamp and Uwe Reyle's
(1993)  From  Discourse  to  Logic,  which  develops  a  modeltheoretic  approach  to  meaning
construction in discourse. This framework, known as Discourse Representation Theory, represents a
formidable achievement in the field of formal semantics and logic. Kamp and Reyle's arguments are
lucid and well-defined. However,  I wish to argue that DRT is less capable at  handling the full
phenomenon of textual engagement, particularly with regards to literary text.. To do this, this thesis
will consider the theoretical bases of DRT and Smith's theory. In doing so, I aim to show a number
of weaknesses inherent in Smith's approach while remaining sympathetic to Smith's motivations. As
such,  I  will  adopt  and  adapt  Smith's  methodology  by  approaching  discourse  modes  within  a
different linguistic model.
Chapter  1  aims to  set  out  the key theoretical  features  of  both Discourse Representation
Theory and Carlota  Smith's  modes  of  discourse.  This  short  introductory section  functions  as  a
critical analysis of both DRT and Smith's work at the root level of axiomatic principles. As we shall
see, Smith's basic theory takes a fairly strict formal approach to textual meaning construction. While
this  approach has  its  positives,  I  argue that  taking DRT as a  basis  actually greatly hinders the
descriptive and explanatory potential of Smith's discourse modes. However, as noted above, Smith's
conclusions and general motivation are worth taking on board and reconsidering. Therefore, what is
required is a new understanding of those grammatical features integral to a theory of discourse
modes, such as tense and aspect.
In Chapter 2, we lay the theoretical groundwork of Cognitive Grammar, as developed by
Ronald Langacker (1987, 1991, 1999, 2002, 2008), which functions as scaffolding for the rest of the
theory  being  constructed  in  this  thesis.  Starting  from  axiomatic  features  of  human  cognition,
Chapter 2 shows how basic grammatical classes, such as those invoked by Smith, evolve quite
naturally and develop into much more complex linguistic structures. Primarily, the focus on this
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chapter is on reinterpreting the grammatical categories of tense and aspect. Moreover, we find that
by its very nature Cognitive Grammar accounts for a much wider range of linguistic phenomena
than afforded by DRT or Smith's explicitly generative approach. Therefore, Chapter 2 shows how
much of Smith's  key ideas  – text  progression,  situation type,  subjectivity,  and surface structure
presentation – can be accounted for by Cognitive Grammar in one way or another. Rather than
focusing on a direct like-for-like comparison, the emphasis is heavily on the theoretical elaboration
of Cognitive Grammar from the bottom up, showing how tense and aspect develop out of more
basic cognitive properties. As we shall see at the end of Chapter 2, a Cognitive Grammar approach
to discourse modes in this way does not square exactly with the model espoused by Smith. The
conclusion of Chapter 2 proposes a possible method of reconciliation.
While Cognitive Grammar accounts for a wide range of phenomena at the syntactic level,
we find upon closer inspection that it is relatively weak in its account of meaning construction at the
level of discourse, above the clause. For a theory of text linguistics involving textual organization at
the level of the passage, this is clearly problematic. Chapter 3 addresses this issue head on and
proposes a resolution. In doing so, we are introduced to Mental Spaces Theory and Conceptual
Blending, as understood through the work of Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002). The basic
thrust  of  this  chapter  concerns  the  nature  of  discourse  modes  as  defined  and  their  possible
characterization as distinct mental spaces invoked in the unfolding of discourse. In this way, we find
that discourse modes actually represent the potential to be properly understood as functional units of
discourse.  However,  Fauconnier  and  Turner's  theories  are  not  without  their  flaws,  the  most
prominent of which concerns the nature of contextual information and pragmatic inference. Chapter
3 therefore includes a detailed elaboration of Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) Relevance Theory
proposed as a strong contender for a meta-contextual framework by which we may constrain the
theoretical claims of conceptual blending. What we find is that a discourse typology so defined has
the potential for much wider applications than previously envisioned, such as in Cognitive Stylistic
analysis of literary narratives.
Chapter  4  presents  a  number  of  very  brief  case  studies  presenting  such  potential
applications. In the opening sections, emphasis is placed on aligning the theory outlined in this
thesis with existing research, particularly in the field of cognitive stylistics. In doing so, we find that
a number of the key claims of this thesis find a number of existing correlates, thereby bolstering the
theoretical claims outlined in the preceding chapters. The chapter concludes on a number of short,
simple case studies featuring instances of rather idealized types. The texts used in the section are
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John Steinbeck's  Of Mice and Men; Everything is Green,  an example of flash fiction by David
Foster Wallace; and 1984 by George Orwell. Similarly, in Chapters 2 and 3, I illustrate a number of
key points  by reference  to  examples  from literary texts.  These  example  are  taken from Ernest
Hemingway's  The Old Man and The Sea;  the more recent  Americanah  by Chimamanda Ngozi
Adichie; Wide Sargasso Sea by Jean Rhys; and finally, Gravity's Rainbow by Thomas Pynchon. It
should be noted from the offset that there is no overaching theme which unites these texts and
necessitates  their  inclusion.  Instead,  they have been chosen for much more pragmatic  reasons..
Firstly, I have attempted to give a broad range of texts from various time periods, with writers of
different sex and race, and with often wildly varying ideological concerns and aesthetic principles.
Secondly, much more prosaically, the specific examples have been chosen primarily because they
are particularly clear examples of the point they are used to illustrate.
These examples are meant as heuristic aids rather than novel instances of literary criticism.
The focus of this thesis is on developing a text type theory of discourse constructions with a solidly
cognitive theoretical approach to language and meaning construction. Rather than attempting to
produce new readings, this chapter aims to show how a discourse mode perspective based on close
linguistic analysis can be used to bolster, promote, and often justify existing interpretations (Carter
and Stockwell 2008: 291-302). This thesis is therefore primarily a theoretical contribution to the
field of stylistics.
In his Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction, Langacker writes:
Starting from single words, like nouns and verbs, we have worked our way up to successively larger  
expressions: to multiword constructions, to full nominals and clauses, and finally to complex sentences. 
The next level is discourse, where any number of sentences (or fragments thereof) are connected to form 
a coherent linguistic production – be it a conversation, a monolog (e.g. a speech), or a written text.  
Although discourse is  often considered a separate  topic, requiring different methods and descriptive  
constructs, the contrast with lower levels is at most a matter of degree. Discourse is in fact the very basis 
for language structure and is thus essential for understanding of grammar.
    2008: 257
I wish to argue that discourse modes can be properly thought of as viable constructs within
CG framework and that they have a number of potential descriptive and explanatory applications. In
achieving this goal, we find that ultimately that Carlota Smith's initial characterization of the modes
of discourse has been left somewhat far back on the horizon. However, the initial springboard for
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the rest of this thesis is to be found in her work. It will therefore be beneficial to consider Smith's
principal ideas.
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1
Discourse and Representation:
A Preliminary Text Typology
0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the theory of discourse modes as most fully
outlined in Smith (2003). To begin, it will be necessary to introduce the framework of  Discourse
Representation Theory, developed by Kamp and Reyle (1993). Following this, we see how the DRT
framework is advanced by Smith to include a class of five discrete discourse modes, each of which
possesses  a  unique  set  of  lexicogrammatical  properties.  The  nature  of  the  five  modes  is  then
discussed  with  reference  to  four  key ideas  –  situation  type,  text  progression,  subjectivity,  and
surface structure presentation.  By engaging critically at a theoretical level, the emphasis in this
chapter is on illustrating potential theoretical and descriptive problems present in both Kamp and
Reyle's and Smith's analyses. However, I hope to show how a number of Smith's insights into the
organization of  discourse  are  worth further  elaboration,  particularly from a  cognitive-functional
perspective. 
1 Discourse Representation Theory
Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) as developed by Kamp and Reyle (1993)1 is a theory of
formal semantics which falls within the model-theoretic paradigm dominant in the latter half of the
20th century. Formulated in response to the theories of Richard Montague (Thomason 1974; Dowty
et al 1981), Kamp and Reyle sought to provide a solution to two seemingly intractable problems
within  such  approaches.  Firstly,  they  looked  to  describe  such  puzzling  problems  as  'donkey
sentences' discussed by the late Peter Geach (1962). Such sentences can be illustrated by (1) below;
in (2), we see a more elaborate instance of the same type.
1) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
2) If a farmer owns some donkey, he beats it.
As Kamp and Reyle observe, this is problematic for the formal semanticist. If we consider (2), we
1 This framework has subsequently been revised by Kamp, Genabith and Reyle (2011). However, for the sake of this 
discussion, it will suffice to focus only on 'classical' DRT.
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find that 'the anaphoric connection we perceive between the indefinite noun phrase some donkey
and the pronoun it may seem to conflict with the existential meaning of the word some' (1993: 1).
Similarly, we find there are issues relating to tense and aspect. Consider examples from French in 3)
and 4):
3) J'ai vécu en France
4) Je vivais en France.
Here we see the difference between the passé composé2 and the imparfait. However, within a formal
semantic framework, 'to articulate precisely what the difference between these tenses is has turned
out to be surprisingly difficult' (1993: 1). Kamp and Reyle therefore posit an added dimension of
linguistic meaning hitherto ignored by formal approaches:
This is the dimension of interpretation: the meanings of linguistic expressions are – or so we would want
to claim – inextricably linked with the interpretive canons that must be brought into play by anyone who  
wants to grasp their sense. DRT tries to remedy the one-sidedness of the model-theoretic paradigm by 
combining its referential perspective with this second interpretation-oriented view-point.
     Kamp and Reyle 1993: 1
Put  simply,  then,  DRT  posits  the  existence  of  semantic  representations  known  as  discourse
representation structures (DRS). These DRSs are interpretations of sentences and texts achieved by
the application of certain rules to the input sentences. These DRS construction rules are in the form
of a Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar, the application of which extends beyond the particular
sentence being interpreted but at the existing DRS into which that sentence is to be incorporated.
Once the DRS is complete, we are then in a position to analyse the DRS from a truth-conditional
perspective  using  predicate  logic,  thereby providing  a  complete  theory  of  logic  and  semantics
(1993: 24). To illustrate this more clearly, we may consider a simple account of the way DRT deals
with pronominal anaphora. 
1.1 DRT in Practice – Pronominal Anaphora
Take the following pair of sentences, in the form of a short 'discourse':
2 In Kamp and Reyle's original discussion of this point, the example used is of the passé simple. However, this has
since become largely antiquated and replaced by the passé composé (Smith 2009: 14; Vinay and Darbelnet 1995:
135)
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1) Pynchon wrote Gravity's Rainbow. It confuses me.
What is of interest to logicians and formal semanticists is the natural way in which the anaphoric 'it'
in the second sentence is taken as referring to 'Gravity's Rainbow' in the first. As we noted above,
DRT posits that this relationship is a result of an abstract semantic representation, defined above as
the DRS. 
As an illustrative aid, the DRS can be viewed schematically in the way shown in 2):
2) Discourse referents
                     Conditions
 
Cann et al (2009) elaborate upon the distinction between the two distinct sections of the DRS as
shown  above.  They  note  that  the  two  tiers  reflect  the  fact  that  DRS  formally  comprise  the
following:
a. a set of variables, x, y, z, … , taken as representations of the entities mentioned in the discourse; 
these  variables  are  called  discourse  referents and  such  a  set  of  variables  in  a  DRS  is  called  its  
universe;
b. conditions,  inserted on the lower part of a DRS, are predications on the discourse referents  
denoting properties or relations tat must be satisfied by the entities corresponding to those discourse  
referents in the model relative to which the DRS will be evaluated for truth
 Cann et al 2009: 152
To return to example 1), the first sentence of the mini-discourse introduces two new referents to the
discourse universe – 'Pynchon' and 'Gravity's Rainbow'. Each noun phrase here represents a unique
entity being introduced. Following the definition of discourse referents above, each noun phrase is
therefore assigned a unique variable. Thus, if we assign 'Pynchon' the variable x, we find that the
first sentence in 1) can be represented as condition 3) below:
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3) [x wrote Gravity's Rainbow]
In  3),  the  square  brackets  are  used  in  place  more  elaborate  structures  such  as  syntactic  tree
diagrams. Syntactic structures such as these will not be included in this expository chapter (see,
however, Kamp and Reyle 1993: 59-139).
With 'Pynchon' now assigned the variable  x, the DRS conditions must also be updated to
reflect this information. DRT represents this information in the following way:
4) Pynchon(x)
Here, 4) should be understood as stating that the variable x stands in place of the individual entity
denoted by the noun phrase, in this case the proper name 'Pynchon'. Updating the schematic DRS
given in 2) with this new information, we end up with 5):
5) x
  Pynchon(x)   
  [ x wrote Gravity's Rainbow]
   
By a similar logic, we assign the discourse referent 'Gravity's Rainbow' the variable y. Introducing
this variable to the discourse universe and adding in the DRS conditions, we arrive at 6):
6)     x  y
   
  Pynchon(x)
      Gravity's Rainbow(y)
           [x wrote y]
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The diagram in 6) therefore represents the DRS for first sentence of 1) – 'Pynchon wrote Gravity's
Rainbow'.
The discourse referents and conditions introduced in the above example were introduced
into a DRS which was initially empty. However, the second sentence is to be added to the newly
developed DRS in 6). However, the method for doing so remains almost identical. Firstly, we see
that the second sentence introduces two entities to the universe of discourse. The first of these is the
anaphoric  pronoun  'It'.  Unlike  noun  phrases  which  introduce  new referents  to  the  universe  of
discourse, pronouns must instead refer to an existing referent within the DRS. Based purely on
syntactic  considerations  of  'It'  as  a  third-person,  singular  neuter  pronoun,  the  'It'  in  this  case
therefore must refer to 'Gravity's  Rainbow'  from the preceding sentence.  Contrast  this  with the
slightly different mini-discourse given in 7):
7) Pynchon wrote Gravity's Rainbow. He confuses me.
Here, the masculine gender would indicate that the anaphoric 'He' of the second sentence must refer
to  'Pynchon'.  This  discussion  overlooks  instances  where  'He'  would  be  ambiguous,  sch  as  in
'Pynchon wrote to Hemingway. He was angry'. In this case, additional assumptions are required to
construct the DRS conditions (Cann et al 2009: 153).
Having established 'It' as referring to 'Gravity's Rainbow', we thus assign 'It' a variable, in
this  case  z. Having established It(z) as a discourse referent,  we the add the DRS conditions to
represent this. As noted above, 'It' refers to 'Gravity's Rainbow', which we may state as 8)
8) It = Gravity's Rainbow
Or, substituting variables (Kamp and Reyle: 68):
9) z = y
Finally, the second sentence of 1) introduces a second referent to the universe of discourse, 'me'. In
this case, 'me' does not function as anaphoric and so is assigned a unique variable. Introducing these
variables and conditions into the DRS results finally in the completed DRS shown in 10):
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10)
         x  y  z  u
  Pynchon(x)
    Gravity's Rainbow(y)
            [x wrote y]
     z = y
    Me(u)
  z confuses u
This represents the final DRS of the two sentences in 1). What should be apparent at this stage is
that the DRS conditions of 10) translate very simply and naturally into truth-conditional statements
of predicate logic – a point which Kamp and Reyle take pains to expand through the rest of their
work (Kamp and Reyle 1993: 73-74; cf also Cann et al 2009: 169-206).
This represents a real strength of DRT which must readily be acknowledged. Moreover, with
some  adjustments  and  expansion  such  a  framework  readily  allows  us  to  deal  with  issues
surrounding tense and aspect by introducing the discourse referents of time (t) and event (e). In this
manner, for example, sentence 11) can be represented as the DRS shown in 12):
11) Pynchon wrote Gravity's Rainbow in 1973.
12)    e  x  y  t
   Pynchon(x)
    Gravity's Rainbow(y) 
   1972(t)
  write(e, x, y)
  Time (e, t)
By  unpacking  the  formal  content  of  the  final  condition  in  the  DRS  above,  Kamp  and  Reyle
incorporates a complex system of temporal relationships which are used to incorporate the temporal
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features of tense and aspect into the formal semantic, model-theoretic representation (1993: 483-
689). In this respect, DRT has been fruitfully applied and developed beyond the original formulation
to represent a formal approach to discourse comprehension with a solid claim for legitimacy (van
Eijck and Kamp 2011). Similarly, DRT is a dynamic theory which seeks to unite truth-conditional
and representationalist approaches to meaning construction (Kamp 1981; Cann et al 2009: 150-151).
Moreover, DRT's formalist ethos has applications outside of linguistics. For example, Ganesalingam
(2013) uses DRT in a unique and novel way to describe the language of mathematics. 
However,  this  formal  framework  of  temporal  relations  is  extremely  complex.  As  more
discourse referents and conditions are introduced into the DRS, there is the risk that DRT quickly
becomes an unwieldy model for practical use by the analyst. Furthermore, as I will argue going
forward,  DRT's  commitment  to  formal,  truth-conditional  semantics,  and  generative  grammar
potentially  hinders  its  descriptive  applicability,  particularly  as  a  model  of  textual  analysis.  In
Chapter  2,  I  present  a  competing  model  of  grammatical  analysis  in  the  form  of  Langacker's
Cognitive Grammar. Then, in Chapter 3, I introduce Fauconnier and Turner's Mental Spaces and
Conceptual Integration Theory. By the end of those chapters, I intend to show how these cognitive-
functional  theories  taken  together  can  describe  and  explain  structures  and  relations  as  DRT in
perhaps a less formal but more intuitive way. 
However, the basic principles of DRT do act as the foundations for Smith's original theory of
discourse modes. The following section seeks to explain a number of Smith's key ideas,  before
attempting to illustrate how this too can be bolstered by a cognitive-functional perspective.
2 From DRT to Modes of Discourse
As noted in the previous section, Kamp and Reyle's DRT introduces the discourse referents of time
and event into their formal model of meaning construction. Smith's theory of the modes of discourse
follows quite naturally from this. However, before considering this, it is worth considering Smith's
motivation for developing her theory in the first place.
 Smith is critical of existing methods of discourse analysis, noting:
It has sometimes seemed, though, that nothing at all is conveyed by linguistic forms while everything is 
due to pragmatics or lexical content […] I propose a local level of discourse, the Discourse Mode, which 
15
has  linguistic  properties  and  discourse  meaning.  I  posit  five  modes:  Narrative,  Report,  Descriptive,  
Information, and Argument.
2003: 1
Observing that a practical issue for the linguist  engaged in the study of discourse is to find an
appropriate level of analysis, Smith argues that the most fruitful level is that of the  passage. The
reasons for this assertion are that, firstly, certain different kinds of passage are intuitively recognised
as making different contributions to the text; secondly, crucially, there are 'characteristic clusters of
linguistics  features'  (2003:  7).  These  features  are  what  define  each  of  the  individual  discourse
modes. Therefore, Smith writes:
Passages of Discourse Modes are linguistic units, since they have recognizable linguistic features. They 
also have rhetorical  significance.  In fact,  the Discourse Modes are  text  units  both linguistically and  
notionally. They function as a bridge between the sentences of a text and the more abstract structures that 
it evokes.
2003: 9
We observe, then, that discourse modes represent a kind of structural organization above the
sentence at the level of the passage. Moreover, the different properties of these modes of discourse
imply that they have different 'meanings' within the extended discourse. Smith begins with some
definitional  work before presenting the wider theoretical framework into which she attempts to
incorporate her analysis. What follows is a brief summary of the key features of her theory.
2.1  Key ideas 
The nature of the five modes is discussed with reference to four key ideas, namely situation type,
text  progression,  subjectivity,  and surface  structure  presentation.  In  discussing  situation  types,
Smith  notes  that  'the  sentences  of  a  text  introduce  situations  into  the  universe  of  discourse'
(2003:12). Situation types in this case can therefore been seen as directly related to the notion of the
referent  e introduced by DRT. The main types as categorized by Smith are events, states, general
statives and abstract entities. Of the latter two types, general statives are expressed by generic and
generalizing sentences which 'invoke patterns of events and states rather than particular situations',
whereas abstract entities refer to facts and propositions. 
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Text progression deals with the way in which these situation types are related to each other;
to the time of the event described; or to a time which is 'internal' to the text. As with situation types,
there is a direct relationship with Smith's notion of the temporal dimension of texts and with DRT's
use of the time referent t. What sets Smith's theory apart from DRT is in her analysis of the specific
clustering  of  lexicogrammatical  features  in  observable  ways.  Those  clusters  of  temporal
grammatical features and situations which are most easily identifiable are what Smith refers to as
the modes of discourse.
In contrast to the strictly formal account which serves as its foundation, Smith's analysis takes a
more qualitative approach. In the Narrative mode there is an advancement of 'narrative time'; in the
Report mode, situations are anchored to Speech time and progresses 'forward and backward from
that time' (2003:13). Therefore, these first two modes are dynamic temporal modes (2003:25), where
the text progresses as time advances. In opposition to this, the remaining three modes are atemporal.
In the Description mode, for example, 'time is static and the text progresses in spatial terms through
the scene described' (2003:13). Moreover, the Information and Argument modes are 'atemporal and
progress by a metaphoric path through the domain of the text' (ibid). Thus, we may summarise the
nature of each of the discourse modes as given below:
The Narrative Mode
Situations: primarily specific Events and States
Temporality: dynamic, located in time
Progression: advancement in narrative time
The Report Mode
Situations: primarily Events, States, General Statives
Temporality: dynamic, located in time
Progression: advancement anchored to Speech Time
The Description Mode
Situations: primarily Events and States, and ongoing Events
Temporality: static, located in time
Progression: spatial advancement through the scene or object
The Information Mode
Situations: primarily General Statives
Temporality: atemporal
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Progression: metaphorical motion through the text domain
The Argument Mode
Situations: primarily Facts and Propositions, General Statives
Temporality: atemporal
Progression: metaphorical motion through the text domain
2003:20
Broadly  speaking,  then,  what  differentiates  the  discourse  modes  is  the  arrangement  of
situations types and text progression. In particular, it is argued that 'temporality in the larger sense is
the key to the discourse modes' (2003:22).  Within Smith's system, I believe this description to be
theoretically and descriptively inadequate (cf Unger 2004).  What is clear, though, is that Smith
wishes to show that our seemingly intuitive understanding of discourse modes is a result of the
various entities and processes introduced into the discourse and their interaction, specifically with
regards to the grammatical encoding of temporal information through tense and aspect.
Subjectivity describes the way in which the text 'conveys access to mind – either the mind of
the writer or a text participant – through communication, mental state, perception and perspective'
(2003:13). As such, subjective forms may appear in any of the Discourse Modes. Similarly, surface
structure  presentation is  a  feature  of  all  text  passages,  looking  to  describe  the  way  that
'presentational features organize the information in a sentence,  usually into topic and comment,
focus  and  background'  (2003:13).  Smith  draws  heavily  upon  traditional  approaches  of  Prague
School functional linguistics (Vachek 1964; Steiner 1982; Luelsdorff 1994) I do not consider this
additional level of analysis to be necessary. In the following chapter, I aim to show how each of the
key features of the discourse modes – situation types, text progression, subjectivity,  and surface
structure presentation – can be explained in more general cognitive terms. Moreover, by introducing
the concept of 'focal adjustments' in language, the model introduced in the following chapter will
show how the key features Smith highlights are in fact much more closely related that allowed for
within the DRT approach Smith adopts.
3 Criticisms and potential
It was noted above that a number of features of Smith's analysis of discourse modes are theoretically
and descriptively inadequate. Furthermore, I believe there are fundamental methodological issues
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raised by her work: for example, how valid is the apparently ad hoc adoption of traditional Prague
School notions of communicative dynamism into the framework of formal semantics? What is the
ontological status of DRT? Moreover, there are a number of seemingly arbitrary definitions which
need to be critically discussed. Consider the following excerpt:
Time  and  space  are  pervasive  in  human  experience  and  in  language  they  are  essential  in  
understanding  the  Discourse  Modes.  Text  progression  depends  on  both  domains.  The  temporal  
modes progress with changes in time and space, while the atemporal modes progress with metaphorical 
changes of location through the text domain.
2003: 92
How  are  we  to  understand  these  'metaphorical  changes  of  location'?  How  are  we  to
understand temporal progression? What is the relationship between time and space? These questions
receive no attention in Smith's  work and thus constitute a weakness in the theory.  However,  to
employ a rather trite idiom, there is a danger here of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
There are a number of positives to be found in Smith's work, such as a novel approach to tense
interpretation (2003:92-104). Further, I believe she is right to say that there is something intuitively
plausible in the idea of discourse modes, though such a statement must be subjected to increased
scrutiny. Moreover, by limiting herself to surface syntactic structure, Smith presents a theory which
provides  a  rigorous  commitment  to  examining  the  role  and function  of  linguistic  forms  in  the
construction and interpretation of discourse.
It  must  be  conceded  that  Smith  openly  states  that  her  work  is  concerned  with  the
construction rules which generate a representation as output and that 'it does not try to account for
the  actual  mental  process  involved in  understanding a  text'  (2003:  56).  This,  of  course,  is  the
prerogative of a truth-conditional approach to meaning construction such as DRT. However, the rise
of the cognitive enterprise means that it is beneficial to re-evaluate such an approach in light of a
growing evidence which shows it to be psychologically implausible. Consider, for example, ongoing
research into grounded (or embodied) cognition (consider as illustrative Barsalou 1999, 2003, 2008;
Pecher  and  Zwann  2005).  Moreover,  an  increasing  body  of  work  seeks  to  understand  the
psychological  aspects  of  discourse  comprehension  in  an  empirically  sound  way  (Sanford  and
Emmott 2012).
However,  if  shorn  of  any underlying  theoretical  commitments,  there  remains  in  Smith's
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argument a certain plausibility and appeal, in that there does seem to be something qualitatively
different about each of the discourse modes. As an as-yet untested hypothesis, I would propose that
a reader presented with 'pure' forms of each mode would intuitively note a difference between them.
There does seem to exist a difference in texture between, say, a short narrative, a newspaper report,
a picturesque description from a travel guide, an encyclopaedia entry, and a well-written academic
paper. Moreover, I believe that Smith argues convincingly in favour of the definitive role played by
tense and aspect in establishing this qualitative difference.
Whatever  the  pros  and  cons  of  its  DRT foundations  and its  Prague  School  inheritance,
Smith's discourse modes are a credible attempt to construct a functional discourse typology based
on  qualitative  linguistic  analysis.  Therefore,  rather  than  characterizing  any  shortcomings  as
insurmountable flaws, I  believe it  is  more beneficial  to incorporate Smith's  model into a wider
framework which can provide the answers  to  these criticisms,  giving a  renewed vitality to  the
concept of discourse modes. In the following chapter,  I propose a theory which may act as the
foundation for this new framework.
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2Cognitive Grammar: 
Theoretical Prerequisites
0  Introduction
Carlota Smith's theory of discourse modes is predicated on the nature of tense and aspect, and the
way that these syntactic categories interact at the discourse level. Smith's understanding of these
categories develops from a specific focus on generative linguistics (Smith 1991, 2009). While a
number of key ideas hold up to scrutiny, this thesis wishes to argue that her reliance on generative
linguistic theory actually hinders the explanatory potential of her idiosyncratic discourse typology.
With excessive attention paid to the formal characteristics of syntactic structure, generative
linguistics has historically and rather famously overlooked the nature of semantics and pragmatics.
While this may arguably be productive at the level of artificially constructed sentences, it proves to
be problematic at the level of discourse. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kamp and Reyle's Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT) is a direct response to this perceived lack; intending, as it does, to
provide a methodology for the generative linguist to move 'from discourse to logic'. By introducing
mental representations in the form of Discourse Representation Structures, DRT is an invaluable
framework for understanding meaning construction within a model-theoretic semantics. Similarly,
its contribution to work in tense logic and so-called 'donkey anaphora' are illuminating and thought
provoking. Moreover, it serves as the basis for Smith's discourse modes, which are, of course, the
real topic at hand.
However, the fundamental theoretical issues surrounding the ontological status of generative
syntax and formal semantics still remain, and are not worth re-examining at present. However, Nist
(1965) serves as an early and still relevant critique of generative grammar as a theoretical model,
one mirrored in many ways by Pullum (2007). The debate between Johnson and Lappin (1997,
2000a, 2000b, 2001) Reuland (2000), and Roberts (2000) is characteristic of the ongoing problems
surrounding the field. recent grammatical theory has tended to criticize or downplay the generative
'rule-based' model of linguistic knowledge, instead focusing on constructional patterns present in
language (cf Goldberg 1995, 2006; Croft 2001; Evans 2009; Taylor 2014).
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Instead,  then,  this  chapter  intends  to  reinterpret  Smith's  key  theoretical  foundations  within  the
framework  of  Cognitive  Grammar.  It  begins  with  a  short  introduction  to  the  most  noteworthy
difference between Cognitive Grammar (CG) and the generative approach favoured by Smith and
DRT.  Following this,  attention  turns  specifically  to  the  'temporal'  syntactic  categories  of  tense,
aspect, and modality.
Taken together, these categories form what CG refers to as the clausal grounding system of
English. As we go on, we shall see that the most important property of this system is that grounding
is not only temporal in nature – that is, serving merely to ground things and processes in time – but
also epistemic. This refocusing has some rather interesting and somewhat unintentional effects on
the typology of Smith's discourse modes. However, as we shall see, CG theory broadly coincides
with GG in a number of ways. Traditional grammatical categories such as nouns and verbs – as well
as  syntactic  functions  such  as  tense,  aspect,  and  agent/patient  roles  –  are  taken  as  axiomatic.
Importantly,  though, rather  than syntactic  structure per se,  the focus is  primarily on conceptual
content. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is essentially a process of reinterpretation as opposed
to total reconstruction. As the focus of this thesis is primarily on the analysis of literary texts, I have
attempted  where  possible  to  illustrate  certain key points  with  examples  from literary texts.  All
excerpt and passages used to demonstrate these points have been chosen as being particularly clear
examples of the issues at hand. I have further attempted to employ as broad a range of texts as
possible, so as not to have too narrow a focus on one particular period or literary movement.
1 Why Cognitive Grammar?
From its  inception,  CG has  been  intended  to  counteract  the  paradigmatic  thread  of  generative
grammar, from which the likes of DRT and Smith's discourse modes ultimately derive. In each of its
successive  formulations  (cf  Chomsky  1965,  1970,  1982  1995),  the  focus  of  GG has  been  on
rigorous formalization of language as a self-contained and well-defined formal system. As such, it
finds  supporting  structures  in  such  fields  as  formal  logic  and  computer  programming.  In  all
instances, generative grammars are designed to account for the seemingly infinite creative capacity
of the human mind for the production and comprehension of language (Chomsky 1967). In its most
basic terms, a generative grammar is 'simply a system of rules that in some explicit and well-defined
way assigns structural descriptions to sentences' (Chomsky 1965: 8).
By contrast, CG as conceived by Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008) seeks to challenge the core
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assumptions of generative linguistics. At root, the argument can be reduced to the following claim:
Since language (for reasons developed later) is neither self-contained nor well-defined, a complete formal
description (a 'generative grammar' in the classical sense) is held to be impossible in principle […] Unless
and until  we have  a  clear  conceptual  understanding  of  what’s  going  on,  there  is  no  point  in  seeking
mathematical precision.
    2008: 10
In contrast to the formalism of generative grammars, CG is explicitly  functional  in its approach.
Moreover, it stands in contrast to other functional theories of language, such as Halliday's Systemic-
Functional Linguistics (cf Halliday 2002, 2004; Halliday and Matthiessen 1999). While CG shares a
lot of common assumptions with Halliday's approach (cf Lemmens 1998: 13), it differs in one key
respect. To whit, '[CG] is based on the insight that grammar is the product of human cognition.
Therefore we must first understand the principles of cognition that determine grammar' (Radden and
Dirven 2007:1). Radden and Dirven further note the following core assumptions of CG:
– The  grammar  of  a  language  is  part  of  human  cognition and  interacts  with  other  cognitive  
faculties, especially with perception, attention, and memory.
– The grammar of a language reflects and presents generalisations about phenomena in the world as
its speakers experience them.
–  Forms of grammar are, like lexical items, meaningful and never 'empty' or meaningless, as often 
assumed in purely structural models of grammar.
–  The grammar of a language represents the whole of a native speaker's  knowledge of both the  
lexical categories and the grammatical structures of her language.
–  The grammar of a language is usage-based in that it provides speakers with a variety of structural 
options to present their view of a given scene.
      
      Adapted from Radden and Dirven 2007: XI-XII
Claims such as these continue to receive support from ongoing research in cognitive psychology
(see as representative, Barsalou 1999, 2012; Pecher and Zwaan, 2005; Lebois et al 2014). Similarly,
the Cognitive Semantics of Talmy (2001) attempts to show how the nature of semantics lies in the
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link between perception and conception.  Indeed, the assumptions listed above tend to be taken as
central  to most – arguably all  – work in Cognitive Linguistics more generally (cf:  Janssen and
Redeker 1999; Croft and Cruse 2004; Evans et al 2007; Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2010).
It is not the goal of the present work to prove the truth or falsity of any of these assumptions.
Rather, it is to show how – taking these assumptions as basic – CG can be beneficially married to a
text typology such as Smith's. As such, the most important of these assumptions for this thesis are
numbers 3) and 5). If we take as given that forms of grammar are inherently meaningful and that
speakers select particular structural configurations to present their understanding of a given scene,
the descriptive possibilities of Smith's discourse modes suddenly comes into sharp focus. Rather
than being simply local clusters of specific lexicogrammatical features at the level of the passage as
Smith  concludes,  CG potentially  allows  us  to  think  of  discourse  modes  as  functional  units  of
discourse above the sentence. Not only does this strengthen Smith's original typology, it also re-
introduces  the  concept  of  text-types  to  cognitive  stylistics  and  cognitively  orientated  discourse
analysis (Herman 2002, 263-300,  Östman 2005). This higher-level, functional application in the
field  of  cognitive  stylistics  forms  the  basis  of  a  later  chapter.  For  now,  we  must  outline  the
theoretical prerequisites necessary to re-evaluate Smith's original notion of discourse modes.
2 Focal Adjustments
Fundamental  to  Langacker's  conception  of  Cognitive  Grammar  is  the  nature  of  designation,
'characterized by the elevation of some entity to a special level of prominence within a predication'
(1987: 183). He goes on to elaborate, stating:
Linguistic  predications are  either  nominal  or  relational.  A nominal  predication designates a  thing,  and
functions as the semantic pole of a noun. Relational predications divide into two basic groups, depending
on whether they designate a process or an atemporal relation.
   1987: 214
While each of these groups designates different syntactic categories, the crucial point to note
is that they derive from the same basic cognitive capacities. As such, it is beneficial to study these
cognitive abilities in a little more detail – but not only in order to understand aspectual classes and
temporal relations, as Smith does (cf Smith 1991). Instead, the assertion here is that the relationship
between nominal and relational predications proves to be greatly more illuminating than Smith's
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approach. The reason for this, quite simply put, is that CG's core assumptions concern the notion of
construal. In defining the notion of construal, Langacker writes:
Our present concern is with a broader phenomenon of which variable designation is only a special case: the
ability of speakers to construe the same basic situation in many different ways, i.e. to structure it by means
of alternate images.
   1987: 117
The nature of the relationship between visual perception and mental imagery continues to
have a complicated and rather turbulent history in psychological circles (cf Pylyshyn 1973, 2002,
2003;  Kosslyn  1994,  2005).  The  present  work  makes  no  claims  towards  contributing  to  the
resolution of these issues. As Langacker somewhat evasively puts it:
It is hard to resist the visual metaphor, where content is likened to a scene and construal to a particular way
of viewing it. Importantly, CG does not claim that all meanings are based on space or visual perception, but
the visual metaphor does suggest a way to classify the many facets of construal, if only for expository
purposes. 
    2008: 55
Elaborating upon this visual metaphor, Langacker labels these facets of construal as  focal
adjustments3. Broadly understood in a tripartite structure, the first such focal adjustment is that of
selection. 
2.1 Selection
Understood simply, selection determines those parts of a scene which are being directly attended to.
This selection is made relative to certain cognitive domains invoked by the predication. To illustrate
this, consider the meaning of 'little' in the following extracts from The Old Man and The Sea  by
Ernest Hemingway:
1) I must remember to eat the tuna before he spoils in order to keep strong. Remember, no matter
 
3 In the sections that follow, the emphasis is on the classification of focal adjustments as outlined in Langacker's
earlier work (cf Langacker 1987a). However, it will be worth noting that Langacker has somewhat revised this
taxonomy in more recent publications (cf 2008). I consider this reorganisation more for clarity of exposition and
pedagogy,  rather  than a substantial  theoretical  improvement on the original  classification. Moreover,  it  is  also
relevant to highlight the greatly expanded taxony of Croft and Cruse (2004: 46).
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how little you want to, that you must eat him in the morning. Remember, he said to himself.
    
     1980[1952]: 48
2) It was difficult in the dark and once the fish made a surge that pulled him down on his face and 
made a cut below his eye. The blood ran down his cheek a little way.
     1980[1952]: 52
3) It would be better to gut the dolphin a little later to save the blood in the meat, he thought. I can 
do that a little later and lash the oars to make a drag at the same time
     1980[1952]: 73
In 1), 'little'  refers to the lack of will on the protagonist's part; in 2), it  is a measure of
distance;  in  3),  it  is  used  to  indicate  a  period  of  time.  While  'little'  retains  a  schematic
characterization indicating a small quantity of some unit, its usage in each domain has a differing
conceptual content. It follows from this that central to the concept of selection is the  scope of a
linguistic  predication,  that  is  to  say  'those  portions  of  a  scene  that  it  specifically  includes'
(Langacker 1987: 118). We call the scope of a predication the base; the maximally prominent entity
designated by this predication, we call its profile. This basic arrangement of base and profile is the
most  fundamental  theoretical  construct  required  to  describe  the  semantic  content  of  linguistic
predications in CG:
The semantic value of an expression resides in neither the base nor the profile alone, but only in their
combination; it derives from the designation of a specific entity identified and characterized by its position
within a larger configuration.
    1987: 183
The archetypal  example  to  illustrate  this  idea  is  that  of  CIRCLE compared to  ARC,  as
illustrated in Figure 1 below. While the concepts share the same base, they differ only in the entity
profiled within this base. However, the conception of ARC as an arc, 'emerges only when the two
are  properly  construed  in  relation  to  one  another'  (ibid).  This  amounts  to  little  more  than  the
tautological statement that we can only understand the concept of ARC – i.e. a close line segment of
the circumference of a circle – by knowing what a circle is in the first place. However, the purpose
of selection as a focal adjustment is primarily related to the distribution of attention and so 'what we 
26
Figure 1                       1987: 184
actually see depends on how closely we examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we
pay most attention to, and where we view it from' (Langacker 2008: 55).
So, we may say that the conceptual base of an expression represents the maximal scope of a
viewing arrangement. Within this base, we find that a certain portion of the content is 'onstage'
(2008: 66), that is to say it serves as the active locus for viewing attention. Finally, then, the profile
represents the focus of attention within the immediate scope. This can be clarified if we consider
Langacker's  example  of  ELBOW,  as  opposed  to  HAND.  For  each  concept,  the  maximal  and
immediate scopes are identical: BODY in the former case and ARM in the latter. Where they differ
is in profiling different substructures of this  immediate scope against the maximal scope of the
conceptual base. This can be represented visually as Figure 2 below.
This schematicity and the movement from the abstract to the specific is at the root of CG.
This point shall be returned to presently in a little more detail. Moving on for the moment, we come
to the next broadly defined category of focal adjustments, those that operate in the construal of
perspective.
Figure 2    2008: 64
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2.2 Perspective
This focus on the construal of perspective is one of the main reasons why CG is so amenable to
application  to  textual  analysis  and  why it  greatly  improves  the  descriptive  content  of  Smith's
discourse modes. These are points to which I shall return at the end of this chapter. Firstly, we
consider the structuring property of figure/ground alignment.
2.2.1 Figure/Ground
In its simplest terms, figure/ground alignment refers to the way in which an entity (the figure) is
perceived to 'stand-out' against the rest of a scene (the ground) and is taken to be a fundamental
feature  of  conceptual  organization.  This  recognition  of  basicness  as  a  cognitive  function is  not
unique to CG but to cognitive linguistics more generally. Consider for example Talmy's cognitive
semantics and existing CL work on perspective and point of view (Talmy 2001: 311-344; Verhagen,
2007; Zlatev 2007). Talmy's work has a narrower focus on the spatial domain. Croft and Cruse
summarize Talmy's main insights, presenting a detailed list of properties of those objects which tend
towards figure/ground construal:
3) Figure Ground
location less known location more known
smaller larger
more mobile more stationary
structurally simpler structurally more complex
more salient more backgrounded
more recently in awareness earlier on scene/in memory
    Croft and Cruse 2004: 56
Adding to this, Langacker observes that figure/ground organization is not domain specific.
Consider, in visual and auditory domains, the now rather anachronistic example of Pong:
[…] while tracking a moving dot (the visual figure) across the screen, I can perfectly well perceive an
occasional beep that stands out as a figure in the auditory domain against the background of silence.
      1987: 122
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Similarly, as we have seen with the discussion of maximal and immediate scope in Section
2.1, hierarchical arrangement of figure/ground organization occurs within single domains as the
base/profile distinction. As we go on, we shall continue to see how figure/ground alignment comes
to  define  a  large  part  of  the  grammatical  and  conceptual  apparatus  employed  at  all  levels  of
language use – from the everyday, through to the literary. However, at this juncture, it is worth
noting one important point, namely that the viewing arrangement need not necessarily coincide the
profiled entity. That is to say, that the 'figure and focus of attention are sometime dissociable even
within  a  single  domain'  (1987:  122).  Sitting  in  a  darkened  room,  there  is  no  possibility  for
figure/ground alignment due to lack of visual contrast. However, there continues to be a focus of
visual attention, even if there is nothing to be seen.
If someone now turns on a flashlight, so that I see a dot of light at the periphery of my visual field, this dot
stands out as the figure against the otherwise dark field even though (by definition) it is not at the center of
my visual attention. Probably I will quickly shift my gaze to the flashlight, bringing the figure into the
focus of visual attention, but the need for this shift indicates that the figure and focus of attention do not
inherently coincide.
         1987: 22
Therefore,  in  this  case,  figure/ground  alignment  serves  to  foreground and  background
certain inputs that are involved in the construal of attentional focus.  In this way,  figure/ground
alignment can be said to constitute the next category of focal adjustments, that of viewpoint. 
2.2.2 Viewpoint
Viewpoint phenomena in language have an extensive literature, deriving from numerous different
theoretical backgrounds (Simpson 1993; Oakley 2009 Dancygier and Sweetser 2012). Generally
speaking, viewpoint concerns one's relationship to the scene being perceived/conceived4. As such,
viewpoint is further analysable as the two sub-structures of vantage point and orientation. Defined
broadly,  vantage point refers to the position from which a scene is viewed; whereas orientation
pertains  to  the  alignment  with  respect  to  the  axes  of  the  visual  field  (Langacker  1987:  123).
Viewpoint is thus an integral part of construal, indicating the speaker's situation with respect to the
scene being construed. Langacker further writes:
4 Langacker (2008: 261) note that 'under the inclusive definition adopted in CG, conception subsumes perception as
a special case'. Talmy (2001) designates both processes taken together as ception.
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We are accustomed to seeing most of the objects in our experience from a canonical viewpoint and in a
canonical alignment with respect to their surroundings […] Specifications of vantage point and orientation
are central to the meaning of many relational expressions.
       1987: 123
Expanding on this point, we find that the construal of a particular vantage point imposes a
structural figure/ground alignment which, as we saw above, is that of foreground and background.
Consider sentences a) and b).
a) The car is in front of the house.
b) The car is behind the house.
Each expression invokes roughly the same underlying conceptual content, with a subject
(the  car)  defined  in  relation  to  its  object  (the  house).  What  differs  is  construal  of  viewpoint.
Whereas in a), the viewpoint is 'such that the subject occupies the path (perceptual or other) that
leads from the viewer's vantage point to the object' (1987: 124), this arrangement is reversed in b).
Thus,  in  a),  the  car  is  foregrounded  and  the  house  backgrounded;  in  b),  the  opposite  is  true.
Examples 4 a) and b) are illustrative of the claim that the same objective situation 'can be observed
and described from any number of different vantage points, resulting in many different construals
which may have overt consequences' (2008: 75).
As with section 2.2.1, it is worth noting that 'the notions of figure, foreground, and focus of
attention do not always coincide, despite the naturalness of their association' (1987: 125). Consider
the following , again taken from The Old Man and The Sea:
4) The clouds over the land now rose like mountains and the coast was only a long green line with 
the gray blue hills behind it. The water was a dark blue now, so dark that it was almost purple.
     1980[1952]: 53
In this case, we may say that the sea itself acts as the foreground for the viewing arrangement. The
focus, on the other hand, would be the land visible in the distance – the coast and the mountains.
Finally, the particular figure of the viewing arrangement would be the clouds, acting as a trajector
moving over the terrestrial landmark. The potential uses of this ability to disassociate aspects of the
viewing arrangement will become more apparent in the discussion of tense and aspect in section 3.2
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2.2.3 Deixis
With  regards  to  viewpoint,  Langacker  notes  that  in  the  canonical  viewpoint  arrangement,  the
vantage point and orientation refer to the actual location of speaker and hearer. This means that a
communicative event is necessarily grounded relative to its participants and to its setting in time and
place. This point forms the basis of another key focal adjustment, namely that of  deixis. Deictic
expressions are those expressions which contain some reference to this shared context. Examples of
deictic  expressions  include  I  and  You,  which  are  each  used  to  designate  participants  in  a
communicative  act.  Others  such  as  Here and  Now,  refer  to  the  time  and  the  place  of  the
communicative act  in  question.  As an  important  corollary to  this,  though,  Langacker  notes  the
following:
The pronouns I and you, for example, have no constant real-world reference. Depending on who is talking
to whom, they refer to different individuals in the context of different usage events. They do, however, have
constant reference in relation to the speech situation referring to the speaker and the addressee, whoever
might assume these roles on a given occasion.
 
          2008: 277
As such, we note that deixis serves to  epistemically ground referents relative to a specific
discourse context. As with viewpoint's relation to aspect, it shall become clear that this definition of
deixis is key to a complete understanding of tense in CG. It also proves to be one of the most
fruitful reasons for attempting to unite CG with Smith's model of discourse modes. 
This having been said, Langacker's CG conception of deixis is conspicuously weak with
regards to its understanding of epistemic grounding in a discourse context, particularly in contrast to
a more robust approach such as DRT. To combat this, Langacker introduces the notion of current
discourse space: 
As  discourse  unfolds,  at  each  step  the  current  expression  is  constructed  and  interpreted  against  the
background  of  those  that  have  gone  before  […]  The  CDS  is  a  mental  space  comprising  everything
presumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for discourse at a given moment.
       2008: 59
31
This  concept  of  a  CDS is  in  all  meaningful  ways identical  to  the concept  of  Discourse
Representation  Structures.  As  such,  certain  issues  arise  similar  to  those  raised  in  the  previous
chapter. While it is superficially acceptable to say that a CDS comprises everything presumed to be
shared by participants, this still does not answer a fundamental question – what can be presumed to
be shared and why? Viewed this way, the issue becomes one of inference and implication and is
therefore 'indisputably pragmatic' in nature (2008: 40).
This criticism is not to challenge the role of deixis in perspective, particularly in relation to
the category of tense. Instead,  what is  contested is  that Langacker's understanding of discourse
contextual grounding is under-developed. This is a key concern which this thesis seeks to address.
For now, we note the basic properties of deixis as a focal adjustment and proceed to the related area
of subjectivity/objectivity.
 
2.2.4 Subjectivity/Objectivity
The notion of subjectivity/objectivity constitutes the final method of construal broadly understood
as related to perspective. Central to this notion is the self-referential character of language. From
what we have already seen, perspective hinges on the roles of viewing arrangement, orientation,
figure/ground alignment and so forth. However, what has been excluded from the discussion so far
is the fact that the source of a communicative act is understood by way of the relationship between
herself and the scene so construed. In a written text, this source may be complex: it could be be the
author  themselves,  or  that  of  a  narrator,  or  a  combination of  narrating voices  (Holquist  1982).
Therefore, we may say that a construal relationship 'holds between the conceptualizer of a linguistic
predication and the conceptualization that constitutes this predication' (1987: 128). Every linguistic
expression  therefore  constitutes  a  particular  construal  relationship.  From  section  2.2.3,  any
expression which is epistemically grounded is deictic. For a construal relationship to be properly
deictic, 'an expression must involve some facet of the ground not only as conceptualizer, but also as
an  object  of  conceptualization'  (1987:  129).   This  balance  is  at  the  root  of  the  nature  of
subjectivity/objectivity. Figure 4 below represents the optimal viewing arrangement. 
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Figure 4    1987: 129
Langacker has a useful analogy from the domain of visual perception:
Imagine yourself in the audience of a theater, watching a gripping play. All your attention is directed at the
stage, and is focused more specifically on the actor presently speaking. Being totally absorbed in the play,
you  have  hardly  any  awareness  of  yourself  or  your  own  immediate  circumstances.  This  viewing
arrangement therefore maximizes the asymmetry between the viewer and what is viewed...
     2008: 77
In this example, we may say that the viewing subject – the audience member – construes herself
with  maximal subjectivity  and the actor onstage with  maximal objectivity.  Extending the theatre
analogy, we may therefore say that the viewer's role is offstage as opposed to the focus of attention
which is onstage. This arrangement is illustrated by diagram a) in Figure 4 above. Diagram b), on
the other  hand,  illustrates  a  situation whereby a  deictic  element  is  put  onstage  as  the focus  of
attention – perhaps where the writer/speaker is discussing herself and situations concerning her.
Thus, b) represents an  egocentric viewing arrangement;  an arrangement 'presupposed by deictic
expressions that designate either a ground element or a relation in which a ground element functions
as a major participant' (1987: 131).
As an illustrative example, consider excerpt 5) below from Wide Sargasso Sea by Jean Rhys:
5) The road climbed upward. On one side the wall of green, on the other a steep drop to the ravine 
below. We pulled up and looked at the hills, the mountains, and the blue-green sea. There was a 
soft warm wind blowing but I understood why the porter had called it a wild place. Not only wild
but menacing. Those hills would close in on you.
           2000[1962]: 58
In this example, we are first introduced to the scene by way of objective construal, in that it is
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described from a wholly external viewpoint. The introduction of 'We' introduces the individuals of
the party before finally introducing the fully subjectified egocentric perspective of 'I understood',
with the narrator affording us access to her thoughts and value judgements. This is amplified by the
deictic grounding in 'Those hills would close in on you'. In this example then, the movement from
objectivity to subjectivity mirrors the process of scanning discussed in 3.2 below.
What should be clear from this example is that subjectivity/objectivity are perhaps more
accurately thought of as points on a cline rather than acting as a binary opposition. In a purely
binary system, it would be unclear how we could account for the intermediary stage of construal of
the  'We'  in  example  5)  above,  where  'We'  is  perhaps  neither  strictly  objective  or  subjecively
construed. This point is addressed by Verhagen (2005, 2007). Building on research by Tomasello
into primate  cognition and human language (Tomasello 1999;  Tomasello et  al  2005),  Verhagen
notes:
Language use, which is dependent on mutually shared knowledge of conventions, is crucially dependent on
recognizing others like oneself. So […] Langacker's initial way of construing the construal relationship
may be treated as a special case of a somewhat more complex configuration that incorporates the insight
that language use comprises more than one subject of conceptualization.
      2007: 60
We  may  say,  then,  Langacker's  original  conception  of  a  canonical  construal  relationship
fundamentally overlooks the fact that the ground consists of both a communicator and addressee.
So, to augment the original conception, the ground may be understood as essentially being 'common
ground' shared by interlocutors. Langacker's later work on CG incorporates this into his analysis of
subjectivity/objectivity construal, as in Figure 5 below. Diagram a) represents the new canonical
viewing arrangement with both Speaker (S) and Hearer (H) constituting the subjects on conception
or the ground (G). Dashed arrows represent the focus of attention with regards to maximal and
immediate scope. In b), we find the construal relationship for an expression which invokes some
reference to G and is therefore in some way grounded. Finally, example c) illustrates this further
with reference to the pronoun you. The final diagram d) is a simplification of c).
It is important to note both the similarities and differences to be found between the notion of
subjectivity in Smith's theory of discourse modes and the notion of subjectivity as understood by
CG. Both theories allow for and indeed place stress on the phenomenon of subjectivity in language 
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Figure 5   2008:261
use.  However,  I  believe  the  benefit  of  Langacker's  approach is  to  be found in  its  minimalistic
theoretic approach (Taylor 2014: 122). In this respect, rather than representing an additional layer of
analysis, as in Smith's model, the construal of subjectivity/objectivity in CG is closely related to
features such as tense and aspect, as shall be shown in the following sections. Similarly, as observed
above, viewpoint and deixis necessarily entail a degree of subjectivity in their construal, allowing
for  the  notion  of  subjectivity  to  become a  more  diffuse  and  pervasive  phenomenon  in  textual
analysis.  I  believe this  minimalism allows for a more integrated approach than DRT or Smith's
model, while simultaneously reducing the complexity of the structures and models proposed.
However,  while  CG's  extended  understanding  of  the  ground  as  a  shared  instance  of
communication acknowledges the role of 'common ground' in construal, it once more has very little
to say on  what can be said to constitute common ground for interpretation and why.  Particularly
with regards to the ongoing construction of the current discourse space, what information is taken
into account and why? Answering this question forms the basis of the following chapter – we are
still some way off from this. Instead, the following sections briefly consider the last of the construal
operations proposed by CG, before turning attention to their  role in the semantics of tense and
aspect.
 2.3 Abstraction
Briefly considered, the final focal adjustment of abstraction concerns the fact that we are capable of
conceptualising situations at  varying levels of schematicity.  By schematicity,  we may take it  to
mean those properties which pertain to specificity or lack thereof or, to put it differently, 'the level of
precision and detail at which a situation is characterized' (2008: 55). We may say that schematic
representations are instantiated by more specific ones, in a process of elaboration. So, we have the
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examples  illustrated  below,  detailing  a hierarchy of  conventionally  recognized  types;  in  b),  an
elaborative hierarchy of successively more detailed, novel expressions.5
a) thing → object → tool → hammer → claw hammer
b) Something happened → A person perceived a rodent → A girl saw a porcupine 
→ An alert little girl wearing glasses caught a brief glimpse of a ferocious porcupine with 
sharp quills.
         2008: 56
While the notion of abstraction may seem – as it were – rather abstract, we find that the idea
of instantiation and elaboration are pivotal in our understanding of the grounding system of English.
The reason for this follows from the fundamental CG assertion that basic grammatical classes are
semantically definable. Langacker's argument is that the concepts generally considered to be 'basic
categories' - such as 'object', 'event', 'location' – are in fact too specific to be valid for all members
of the class. As such, basic categories much be sought at a higher degree of specificity (2008: 95-
98).  At this higher level, we find the two most basic of basic categories – things and relationships.
3 Things and Relationships
To understand the connection between things and relationships, we return to the notion of profiling
as outlined in Section 2.1. Following Langacker, we may say that profiling is of central importance
because
what determines an expression's grammatical category is not its overall conceptual content, but the nature
of  its  profile  in  particular.  It  stands  to  reason  that  the  profile  should  have  a  determining  role  in
categorization, for it is what an expression designates: the profile is the focus of attention within the content
evoked.
      2008: 98
For example, there are two distinct semantic values for the lexical category of record. In the
first instance record functions as a verb; in the latter,  record functions as a noun. This is why we
may say, somewhat tautologically, that we record a record. It is important to note, therefore, that the
distinction between a thing and relationship depends on which aspect of the conceptualization one
chooses to profile. We thus find ourselves back where we started at the beginning of Section 2,
5 Arguably, Langacker's elaboration of b) misses out a few steps but it serves as a useful illustrative aid.
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having now outlined the basic cognitive capacities employed in linguistic construal.
This conceptual link between things and relationships is of fundamental importance to this
thesis as a whole. Throughout the following sections, the reader is asked to bear in mind Smith's
original characterisation of discourse modes. In particular, I wish to draw attention to Smith's notion
of temporal progression and situation types. In what follows, I assert that Langacker's CG approach
provides a stronger – and much more unified – account of these phenomena than does Smith's. The
upshot of which, which will be outlined in the final section of this chapter, is that Smith perhaps
goes further than is theoretically justifiable in her taxonomy of discourse modes. We shall see that
by minimising  these  claims,  we are  actually in  a  position  to  strengthen the  arguments  for  the
descriptive and explanatory potential of discourse modes. By the end of this chapter, we shall see
how the movement from cognitive functions to basic grammatical classes leads quite naturally to
structural organization at the level of discourse.
What  follows  shall  first  briefly  outline  the  nature  of  things  in  CG.  While  not  directly
relevant to the development of a theory of discourse modes, we shall see that relationships can only
be understood relative to things. This comprehensive approach to discourse represents, I believe, a
great strength of the theory being developed. 
3.1 Things
The  basic  conceptual  schema for  a  thing  derives  from the  cognitive  abilities  of  grouping and
reification. Grouping derives from factors such as contiguity and similarity (2008: 104). Moreover,
this grouping occurs at multiple levels of conceptual organization. Therefore, in Figure 6 below, we
may say that a) forms two groups – one with two dots, the other with three. This is a matter of
contiguity. However in b) we group the black dots into two groups of three – thus, they are grouped
by similarity.
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Figure 6   2008: 105
Reification occurs when these groups of clustered entities are conceived of as unified, single
entities at higher levels of conceptualization. The outcome of this dynamic interaction of grouping
and reification is what CG designates as a thing. Langacker proposes that the basic schema for a
noun coincides with that of a thing – that is to say, properly defined, a noun profiles a thing. It is
worth noting that this claim is not without its detractors. For example, Croft's Radical Construction
Grammar (2001) challenges the very notion of a noun as a basic grammatical class. However, the
purpose of this thesis is not to critique Langacker's core assumptions in this regard. Instead, we take
this definition of a noun as axiomatic and proceed with the work at hand.
Traditionally understood, nouns can be further split into two subclasses – count  and mass.
The reader is referred directly to Langacker's work for a detailed exploration of the semantic and
grammatical characterizations of count and mass nouns (1991: 13-42). What is pertinent to note at
this stage is the following conclusion, illustrated in Figure 7:
A noun profiles a thing, defined as any product of grouping and reification. In the case of a count noun, this
thing is construed as being  bounded within the immediate scope in the domain of instantiation. The
profile of a mass noun is not construed as being bounded in this fashion.
      2008: 132 (emphasis in original)
This distinction between count/mass and bounded/unbounded in nominal predications proves to be
a key insight into our understanding of relational phenomena in CG, particularly with regards to
aspect.  We shall  return to this  in Section 3.2.1 below. Keeping this  in mind,  we now turn our
attention to the nature of relationships in CG. 
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Figure 7   2008: 13
3.2 Relationships
Relational  predications,  like  things,  can  be  conceived  of  at  multiple  levels  of  organization  by
grouping and reification. Where relational expressions differ from things, is by the fact that they
have  an  added  temporal  dimension.  Relationships  can  therefore  be  described  as  being  either
temporal or atemporal. In line with Langacker (2008), we refer to this distinction as being either a
process or a  non-processual relation; non-processual relations can be further described as being
either simplex or complex.
In  all  instances  of  relational  expressions,  there  is  an  asymmetry  between  profiled
participants.  These  focal  participants  are  profiled  at  different  levels  of  prominence.  The
predominant figure within this relational profile is termed the trajector (tr); other salient entities in
the predications are termed landmarks (lm) (1987: 217). If we consider the case of non-processual,
simplex relationships, we find that the interaction between the trajector and landmark reduces to a
'single  configuration  fully  manifested  at  a  single  point  in  time'  (2008;  109).  As  such,  non-
processual, simple relationships define states or stative relations. A number of traditional categories
can  be  characterized  in  this  regard  –  for  example,  adjectives,  adverbs,  and  prepositions.  The
schematic representations of these categories are show in Figure 8 below.
In  contrast  to  these  simple  non-processual  relationships,  we  may  also  conceive  of
relationships which are  complex, that is to say, relationships built from a number of component
relationships. As a corollary to this, complex relationships tend to evolve dynamically through time.
Thus, complex relationships define  events. Langacker gives the example of a ball rolling down a
hill:
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Figure 8   2008: 116
The situation obtaining at any one moment constitutes a simplex relationship: a single configuration in
which the ball occupies one particular location. The overall event comprises an indefinite number of such
relationships and is therefore complex.
  2008: 109
Figure 9 given below illustrates the basic schematic conceptualisation of a ball rolling down
a hill.  The  entire  event  is  characterized as  a  series  of  individual  states.  However,  this  discrete
representation  of  component  states  does  not  accurately reflect  the  way we actually  experience
events – we do not conceptualize events as separate successive states but rather as a continuous and
unbroken whole which 'unfolds'  and develops organically.  In Figure 9 above,  this  continuity is
represented by the wedge (>).  As with the previous discussion of focal adjustments, Langacker
proposes that this continuity of perceptual (and conceptual) experience is a result of a quite ordinary
cognitive function, which he terms scanning. This notion of scanning relates further to Langacker's
proposed  distinction  between  conceived  time and  processing  time.  This  distinction  is  best
summarised in Langacker's own words:
Figure 9   2008: 109
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[The arrow in Figure 9] represents conceived time (t), time as an object of conception. We conceive of time
whenever  we  conceptualize  an  event  (which  by  definition  is  manifested  temporally).  Of  course,  sine
conceptualization is a mental activity, it happens  through time and has its own temporal duration. Time
functioning as the medium of conception is referred to as processing time. 
          2008: 110 
With this in mind, it is clear that we must differentiate in principle between the time when an
event actually occurs and the time of its conception. Of course, this distinction may not always be
necessary of relevant. For example if one considers Figure 10 below, we find that conceived time
(T1–T5) directly coincides with processing time (t1-t5). While only one state is in focus at any given
instance, the whole event is mentally tracked sequentially as it unfolds along the temporal axis. As
such, we call this  sequential scanning. This form of mental scanning is employed whenever we
directly observe an event. As Langacker observes:
If a relationship develops through time, the most natural way of apprehending it is to track it through time
in this manner. Hence, sequential scanning is equally applicable whether an event is observed, remembered
or imagined.      2008: 111
In contrast to sequential scanning, summary scanning occurs when there is not only one component
state in focus at a given moment of processing time. Instead, states are superimposed onto one
another and represented as a single gestalt where all constitutive states are active and available for
conception simultaneously. The effect is thus similar to a multi-exposure photograph, as opposed to
the 'motion picture' effect of sequential scanning. Figure 11 below represents a ball rolling down a
hill as an event conceived as a product of summary scanning.
Figure 10   2008: 110
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Figure 11  2008: 112
Summary scanning in this way is an important part of textual meaning construction. As a
particularly illustrative example, consider the following excerpt from Americanah by Chimamanda
Ngozi Adichie:
It surprised Ifemelu, how much she had missed Nsukka itself., the routines of unhurried pace, friends gather
in her room until past midnight, the inconsequential gossip told and retold, the stairs climbed slowly up and
down as though in a gradual awakening, and each morning whitened by the harmattan.
     2013: 92
In  this  passage,  memories  are  presented  in  the  form  of  a  list.  Individually,  these  are  fairly
commonplace  memories  of  daily  life  and  lived  experience.  However,  each  of  these  individual
memories  combine  by  way  of  summary  scanning,  each  adding  to  the  overall  construction  of
meaning. In this case, it  is Ifemelu's nostalgia and longing for the minutiae of her past life and
experiences, each introduced in excessively fine detail. This list proceeds further, culminating in the
following extract:
The church bazaars would leave the air redolent, smoky from ass cooking. Some nights, the heat lay thick
like a towel. Other nights, a sharp cold wind would descend, and Ifemelu would abandon her hostel room
and, snuggled next to Obinze on his mattress, listen to the whistling pines howling outside, in a world
suddenly fragile and breakable.
      2013: 93
In the end, we are led to infer that the collective memory of these experiences is, in itself, fragile
and breakable.  Adichie thus exploits a key feature of summary scanning in order to illustrate a
certain claim about the persistence of memory and its inherently delicate nature.
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Generally speaking,  summary scanning is  employed in the conception of complex, non-
processual events as defined above. Similarly, we define a process as 'a complex relationship which
develops  through  conceive  time  and  is  scanned  sequentially  along  this  axis'  (2008:  112).  CG
proposes as a basic notion that a verb profiles a process; verbs, therefore entail sequential scanning
in their semantic categorization. The construal of scanning therefore allows CG to account for some
of the less clear aspects of Smith's original theory.  For example, in characterizing the temporal
features of the Description mode, Smith notes that 'time is static and the text progresses in spatial
terms through the scene described' (2003:13). Within her model, this functions as a handy metaphor
for describing temporal progression through a static scene. However, it is difficult to justify fully
within Smith's theory. The CG phenomenon of scanning goes some way towards explaining this
phenomenon in more detail. Moreover, like the other focal adjustments elaborated above, scanning
is intimately related and tightly integrated within the CG framework. The principles which result in
the construal of viewpoint and subjectivity/objectivity are the same which determine the construal
of scanning.
As a final step of theoretical exposition, we shall now briefly elaborate on the nature of
verbs in CG before turning our attention to the grounding system of English and how this ties in
with the notion of discourse modes.
3.2.1 Verbs
In Section 3.1, we saw that the primary distinction between mass and count nouns derives
from basic  conceptual  functions of  grouping and reification.  CG maintains that  this  mass/noun
distinction holds as being directly applicable to processes as well as to things. Thus, we derive the
distinction between perfective and imperfective verbs – where the former are bounded in time and
the latter are not specifically bounded. For things, this bounding can be abstract, depending on the
domain of instantiation. However, with verbs, the domain of instantiation is always time. As such,
Langacker writes:
The perfective/imperfective contrast therefore hinges on whether the profiled process is bounded within the
immediate temporal scope, and it is bounded if there is some limit to the set of constitutive entities.
    2008: 152
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Figure 12   2008: 153
Figure 12 above depicts this in a schematic way. The important point to note is that in a), the entire
profiled process falls within the immediate temporal scope in the domain of instantiation – in this
case, time. A) therefore represents a perfective verb. In contrast, the process in b) exists indefinitely
for an undefined time in either direction along the temporal axis. Instead, the immediate temporal
scope focuses on a specific segment of the process and puts this onstage for focused viewing (2008:
152).
From  this  basic  arrangement  of  perfective/imperfective  verbs,  we  are  in  a  position  to
develop  conceptual  schema  for  more  complex  tense  relationships.  We  adopt  the  'naive
characterisation' (1991: 250) of tenses. That is to say, use of the past tense indicates that the process
occurs prior to the time of speaking; the present tense indicates that the instance of the process
coincides with the time of speaking (2008: 157). This basic configuration is represented by Figure
13, where the box containing the zigzag line represents the specific speech event.
With this in mind, we are in the position to assign further semantic value to more complex
tense arrangements.  Upon more detailed inspection, we find that perfective and imperfective verbs
can both occur in the past tense and the present tense, though with a certain degree of qualification
in  the  case  of  present  perfectives.  Consider  the  following  examples  in  6),  along  with  their
conceptual schema as shown in Figure 14 below.
Figure 13   2008: 158
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Figure 14   2008: 158
a) He learned the poem. [PAST PERFECTIVE]
b) *He learns the poem. [PRESENT PERFECTIVE]
c) He knew the poem. [PAST IMPERFECTIVE]
             d)          He knows the poem.              [PRESENT IMPERFECTIVE]
    2008: 157
Each of these cases holds as unproblematic, with the exception of the present perfective in 6
b). However, this can be easily resolved; contextual information will tend to override any perceived
lack of grammaticality. For example, the present perfective occurs with conspicuous regularity in
sports commentating, as illustrated by Langacker's example:.
He hits a high fly to left. Jones comes in a few steps... he shades his eyes... he grabs it for the final out.
    2008: 159
This usage is indicative of present tense perfective in the default viewing arrangement6. A related
instance of present tense perfectives can be found in the field of narratology, in the form of the
historic  present  and  narrative  present (Fludernik  2003).  Fludernik's  terminology  is  distinctly
narratological  and functions  at  a  level  above  that  of  the  purely linguistic,  as  it  were.  Stylistic
concerns such as this are to be addressed more directly in Chapter 4. 
6 In a special case of this default arrangement, performatives are defined as an instance of a present perfective 
process where the event profiled is the speech event itself (2008: 159). 
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For  now,  though,  we  consider  those  complex  tenses  derived  from tense  morphemes  in
conjunction with present or past participles7. These participles are instrumental in the formation of
complex tenses and aspectual clauses. Participles have, according to Langacker's CG, a 'substantial
impact on the processual base ' (2008: 120) by invoking a certain vantage point. Langacker writes:
English  shows  this  fairly  clearly.  The  so-called  present  participle,  formed  with  -ing,  take  an  'internal
perspective' on the verbal process. The so-called past participle, derived by -ed (and a variety of irregular
inflections), adopts a posterior vantage point.
  2008: 120
What we find on the CG account, then, is that tense and aspect in and of themselves afford a certain
degree of access to those focal adjustments discussed above. 
Consider,  for  example,  the  following  short  excerpt  from  Thomas  Pynchon's  Gravity's
Rainbow:
A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now.
It is too late. The Evacuation still proceeds, but it's all theatre. There are no lights inside the cars. 
No light anywhere. Above him lift girders old as an iron queen, and glass somewhere far above that  
would let the light of day through. But it's night. He's afraid of the way the glass will fall – soon – it will 
be a spectacle: the fall of the crystal place. But coming down in total blackout, without one glint of light, 
only great invisible crashing.
          Pynchon (2000[1973]: 3)
We  find  in  this  passage  an  example  of  the  historic  (narrative)  present,  as  defined  above.
Stylistically, we may say that this results in an immediacy, similar perhaps to the blow-by-blow
sports  commentary  in  Langacker's  example.  This  immediacy  is  further  compounded  by
nominalization  of  'screaming'  in  the  opening  line  which  would  otherwise  act  as  a  present
progressive. Following this, we have the past perfect 'has happened', which promptly shifts forward
in time, establishing a new deictic centre in 'there is nothing to compare it to now'. Later in the
passage, there is yet another temporal shift forward with 'the glass will fall – soon – it will be a
spectacle'. Alongside this, there is an ambiguity in this passage as to role of the narrating voice.
There  is  a  potential  movement  between  objective  and  subjective  construal  of  underspecified
7 The formation of these participles follows a similar path as the formation of things and relationships, by way of 
grouping and reification, scanning, and so forth. In order to avoid repetition and for purposes of exposition, this 
process is not covered here in detail. However, the reader is referred to Langacker (2008: 119-127) for elaboration.
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anaphoric 'him'. Firstly, 'he'  is construed as the focus of the viewing arrangement, acting as the
landmark  of  the  phrase  beginning  'Above  him  lift  girders'  and  is  thus  construed  objectively.
Similarly , though, the introduction of the mental state in 'He's afraid' implies a certain degree of
subjective construal. This subjective construal may perhaps lead us to consider the 'future' event of
the glass ceiling crashing down as more of an anxious premonition on the part of a subjectively
construed individual,  rather  than an objectively construed state  of  affairs  However,  the  present
progressive 'coming down' and the nominalized progressive in 'one great invisible crashing' serve to
reinforce the immediacy and the internal view of this event.
At this stage in the text we are uncertain as to what the 'screaming' is that comes across the
sky and do not know who the 'him' referred to actually is. However, the frequent temporal shifts and
subtle  movement  between  subject  and  objective  construal  potentially  creates  an  instability  in
interpretation. As readers, we are given no sure footing on which to plant ourselves in order to make
sense of the text-world in which we find ourselves. This anxiety potentially mirrors Pychon's larger
concerns with temporality and identity in (post-)modernity, as present in Gravity's Rainbow and his
work more generally (Mattessich 2002; Gourley 2013).
As the above examples show, a CG approach to textual analysis can afford rich evidence in
favour of literary interpretations, even just at the level of tense and aspect. This combination of
lexical verbs, tense morphemes and auxiliary verbs comprises the clausal grounding system of the
English language. The following section shall briefly note the most important features of clausal
grounding not yet covered, before concluding this chapter on a discussion of the relevance of this to
discourse modes.
4 Clausal Grounding
A finite clause profiles a process. As such, a finite clause profiles a grounded instance of some type.
Following  Section  2.2.4,  we  say  that  the  ground  and  the  grounding  relationship  are
(inter)subjectively construed. That is to say, that only the grounded entity is onstage in any given
instance. In contrast to nominal grounding which is concerned with identifying a particular thing,
clausal grounding seeks to address when events happen relative to a particular shared discourse
space. The distinction between past, present, and future events is related to the actual or potential
occurrence of an event. Clausal grounding is therefore primarily epistemic.
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According to Langacker's conception of CG, discourse participants share a discourse space
(2.2.3). While never completely identical, Langacker argues that interlocutors share enough of an
overlap in their  conception of reality to  allow successful  interaction (2008:  297).  In particular,
Langacker  focuses  on  what  the  speaker  in  a  communicative  act conceives  of  as  being  real.
Langacker writes:
An occurrence construed imaginatively can thus be conceived as real by the speaker and presented as real
through clausal grounding […] The reality invoked in a finite clause as the basis for epistemic judgement is
therefore not to be identified with either the 'real world' or things considered 'real' in an ordinary, non-
linguistic sense.
    2008: 298
The clausal grounding system of English comprises a primary centre of  tense and the five
basic  modals –  may,  can,  will,  shall,  must8.  A full  characterisation  of  the  modals  shall  not  be
covered  here.  Instead,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  conceptual  semantics  of  force-dynamics
developed at great length by Talmy (2001); and to Hart (2010) for a fruitful application of this
force-dynamic  model  to  discourse.  Here,  we  only  briefly  sketch  the  nature  of  the  modals  –
specifically, that they tend to represent the implication of force and a propensity for action.
With this in mind, modals have two distinct senses. Specifically, modals can be described as
having a root sense and an epistemic sense. Roots modals tend to make reference to notions such as
'obligation, permission, intention, and ability' (2008: 305). In this case, the idea of force represents
an abstract force rooted in social interaction. Therefore, a root modal is geared towards effecting the
grounded process, by attempting to bring about a particular process or event. In contrast to this,
epistemic modals are related to knowledge, likelihood, and probability:
Figure 15     2008: 300
8 Similarly, the 'past tense' modals – might, could, would, should, must.
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Thus it bears on the grounded process not in terms of bringing it about, but rather in terms of accepting it
as  real.  If  root  modals  are  aimed at  effective  control  of  occurrences,  epistemic  modals  are  aimed at
epistemic control.
    2008: 306
According  to  Langacker,  then,  tense  serves  to  locate  an  event  in  time  relative  to  the  time  of
speaking; modals pertain to likelihood of occurrence; and the auxiliary verbs function to impose
particular ways of viewing a process.  Taken together,  these syntactic  properties  function as the
English grounding system, indicated by the table given in Figure 15 above.
At this point, we turn back to Carlota Smith's typology of discourse modes, with the newly
outlined Cognitive Grammar framework.
5 Discussion
The  CG  characterisation  of  tense  and  aspect  coincides  with  Smith's  in  a  number  of  ways,
particularly in relation to their handling of tense and aspect..  However,  CG shows is that these
grammatical categories develop quite naturally from very basic cognitive functions, regardless of
their  apparent  complexity.  Moreover,  at  each  successive  level  of  representation,  the  functions
involved are identical in their application. This results in a number of intermediate conclusions.
Firstly,  CG argues  that  a  wide  range of  seemingly unrelated  properties  of  language are
encoded and communicated  by the  same means.  To choose  three  arbitrary examples,  temporal
phenomena, perspective and viewpoint, and foreground/background alignment are all a function of
grounding, selection, profiling, and so forth. This property of CG assumes added importance in
relation to Smith's theory and methodology. From Chapter 1, we saw how Smith sought to define
discourse  modes  in  relation  to  temporal  progression,  situation  types, subjectivity  and  surface
structure  presentation.  It  should  be  immediately  apparent  that,  from  the  Cognitive  Grammar
perspective,  this  distinction  is  at  once  arbitrary and unnecessary.  While  Smith  works  from the
premise that these phenomena are to be understood by different means and methods, CG takes a
more holistic approach.
With this in mind, it is worth asking: how much of Smith's original typology stands up to
scrutiny? Firstly, consider the Narrative and Report modes. Smith argues that what sets these modes
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apart  in  principle  is  the  differing  nature  of  temporal  progression  of  the  events  and states  they
contain. Narrative, it is argued, advances chronologically through narrative time; Report advances
through deictic time. According to our understanding of tense, modality and epistemic grounding as
outlined above, this distinction no longer seems tenable. All clausal grounding is inevitably deictic.
Similarly, consider the proposed difference between the  Information  and  Argument  modes. These
modes are both understood as being 'atemporal' and are contrasted based on the truth-conditional
value  of  the  states  introduced into  the  discourse.  This  is  problematic,  in  that  it  presupposes  a
knowledge in advance of the truth-values of linguistic predications. That is to say, there is no way in
principle to differentiate between the situation types that Smith proposes as basic. Grammatically
speaking, facts are equivalent to conjecture. 
As  a  result  of  this,  this  thesis  makes  the  following  proposal.  At  best,  we  can  say that
Narrative and Report both seek to develop discourse along  temporal lines: that is,  to develop a
narrative. Argument and Information, ostensibly atemporal, seek to develop along epistemic lines;
that is, to provide an exposition on a speaker's position. Therefore, this thesis suggests that, rather
than  Smith's  five-way  framework,  we  may  collapse  these  categories  and  simplify  somewhat.
Instead, the proposal is that we consider only three discourse modes – Narrative, Description, and
Exposition. This simplification does not result from an aesthetic drive for minimalism. Rather, it
derives  ultimately  from  the  nature  of  clausal  grounding  in  English  as  understood  within  the
theoretical framework of Cognitive Grammar. This three-way division has the convenient property
of correlating with the division between processes,  non-processual simplex,  and non-processual
complex relations.
This reinterpretation carries with it the added benefit of the greatly increased descriptive
possibilities  of  a  holistic  theory of  language.  Text-types  so defined in  this  way have the good
fortune of being  functional in their definition; of being cognitively grounded in their elaboration;
and  theoretically  robust  in  their  ontological  status.  To  put  this  another  way,  starting  from the
observable,  regular  clustering  of  specific  lexicogrammatical  features  at  a  discourse  level  and
describing  these  clusters  by  way  of  Cognitive  Grammar,  this  represents  a  legitimate  and
psychologically plausible way to argue for the existence and practical application of a text-type
approach to discourse.
However, Langacker's Cognitive Grammar is not, in and of itself, the stopping point of this
theory. CG provides a strong theoretical basis for describing syntactic categories such as tense and
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aspect  in  relation  to  their  semantic  values.  For  this  reason,  it  goes  far  above  and beyond  the
linguistic theories utilised by Smith, and Kamp and Reyle. In particular, I argue that CG affords us a
more fine-grained understanding of discourse modes from the individual word, through the clause,
up to the level of discourse. To quote Langacker:
We can find regularities in discourse sequences of any size, viewed at any level of organization. What level
we examine determines the scope of the patterns and dependencies described.
   2002: 151
Bearing this in mind, I believe the notion of discourse modes elaborated above represent salient
discourse level constructs which develop quite naturally out of Langacker's theory of Cognitive
Grammar.
Fundamentally,  though,  Langacker's  conception  of  the  current  discourse  space  (2.2.3)
remains unconvincing. In Langacker's model, I see the CDS as being identical in every real way to
the notion of a  discourse representation structure in DRT. This is not a major criticism per se.
Langacker's theory of language is primarily geared towards understanding language at the level of
the sentence, with meaning construction at the discourse level being something of an afterthought.
In this way, CG does not lend itself easily to direct application at the discourse level. Moreover,
now that we have introduced the notion of discourse modes, the principles behind the construction
of the CDS require closer attention. 
For this, the concept of a mental space is one that deserves elaboration. This will serve as
the basis of the following chapter. While this chapter has been centred on reinterpreting discourse
modes from a CG perspective, what follows builds upon our newly developed tripartite structure.
Instead of asking what discourse modes are and why they come about, I now wish to ask how they
may be  employed  in  the  most  fruitful  way at  the  level  of  discourse.  Unexplained  so  far,  for
example, is how discourse modes interact and combine at the level of discourse. With this in mind,
we now turn to Mental Spaces Theory.
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3Blending, Relevance and Style:
Discourse Modes in Context
0 Introduction
In  the  previous  chapter,  we  saw  how  Cognitive  Grammar  explains  traditional  grammatical
categories  as  developing out  of  a  core  subset  of  basic  cognitive  abilities.  Moreover,  Cognitive
Grammar incorporates a large number of  construal operations into its basic framework, thereby
allowing us to account for a large number of seemingly disparate phenomena at the level of the
sentence. As a corollary to this, we saw that the nature of the clausal grounding system, viewed
holistically, provides a strong theoretical basis for proposing the existence of discourse modes as
functional units of language at the discourse level, with minor modifications to Smith's original
typology. 
However,  a number of questions remain unanswered. Firstly,  in what way are discourse
modes understood to be functional? Secondly, how do the various modes interact? Finally, how – if
at all – can a text-type approach to discourse result in fruitful analyses with regards to, say, literary
fiction?  The answers  to  these  questions  have considerable overlap in  partially related  fields  of
pragmatics and stylistics, and in narratology more generally. Therefore, this chapter aims to develop
discourse modes as a tool to be utilised in the practice of text analysis. The primary proposal is that
the three discourse modes defined in the previous chapter – Narrative, Descriptive, Exposition – can
be most beneficially understood in relation to widely-known stylistic features. In this regard, this
approach is  best  understood in relation to  existing models  of text  analysis  such as Text  World
Theory (Werth 1999; Gavins 2007); Contextual Frame Theory (Emmott 1997); and related work in
the  fields  of  cognitive  stylistics,  poetics,  and  narratology  (cf  Herman  2002:  Stockwell  2002;
Dancygier 2011). 
The starting point for this model is to be found in Langacker's own notion of the  current
discourse space. In the previous discussions (cf Chapter 2 – 2.2.3), it was noted that Langacker's
conception of the CDS is somewhat inadequate. Taken at face value, Langacker's conception of a
CDS provides no real framework for explaining: 1) what legitimately constitutes shared knowledge
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between speaker and hearer9; 2) how speaker/hearers choose which information to include or ignore
as relevant to interpretation; 3) how new information is added to the current discourse space and
how, if at all, this combines with existing knowledge to create new structures.
To  his  credit,  Langacker  (2002)  attempts  to  address  these  issues  directly.  Primarily,
Langacker attempts to contextualize the CDS with reference to 'discourse expectations'. Linguistic
structures can therefore be understood as  instructions intended to modify the current  discourse
space in particular ways:
Each  instruction  involves  the  focusing  of  attention  within  a  viewing  frame.  A discourse  comprises  a
succession of frames each representing the scene being 'viewed' and acted on by the speaker and hearer at a
given instant.
    2002: 151
This re-imagining of the CDS in terms of discourse frames is a considerable improvement, invoking
as it does Emmott's notion of Contextual Frames (1997). Again, though, Langacker is at a loss to
explain  how exactly these  frames  update  the  CDS in  productive  ways.  By his  conception,  the
process is wholly additive, with 'each increment of structure merely remaining in place, essentially
unmodified, as further increments come along' (2002: 180). While this has a certain validity, it is in
no way different to Kamp and Reyle's Discourse Representation Theory – the only exception being
Langacker's avowedly 'cognitive' persuasion.  Moreover, Langacker's theory rests on some rather
ad-hoc assumptions regarding memory which seem to contradict and undermine his own arguments
(2002: 177-181).
While  these  methods  of  discourse  interpretation  may be  adequate  for  limited  linguistic
phenomena  such  as  anaphora  and  reference,  they  represent  a  rather  one-dimensional  view  of
meaning construction in this regard. In addition to this, the three criticisms raised above are still left
unaddressed.  In  what  follows, the goal  is  to  create  a  more rounded model  of  interpretation by
introducing Mental Spaces Theory, with particular reference to Conceptual Integration. Following
this, the whole endeavour is situated within the pragmatic, meta-contexual framework of Relevance
Theory. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief excursion into Cognitive Stylistics by way of a
small set of case studies, illustrating instances from literary fiction where discourse modes can be
seen to play an important, interpretative function.
9 For the purposes of text analysis, the speaker/hearer is taken to include the relationship between the text and the 
reader. 
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1 Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration
The notion of mental spaces employed here derives from research conducted in  Mental Spaces
Theory  (MST) instigated by Fauconnier and Turner (Fauconnier 1985, 1997; Turner 1991, 1996
Fauconnier  and  Turner  1995,  2002).  Building  from the  basic  principles  of  MST,  research  has
focused on the ways in which mental spaces combine in the act of conceptual integration10. This
work derives from numerous diverse fields: from cognitive semantic approaches (Fauconnier and
Sweetser 1996; Grady et al. 1999; Coulson 2000); the cognitive semiotics of the 'Aarhus School' (P.
Brandt 2004; L. Brandt and P. Brandt 2005; L. Brandt 2012); and in the pragmatics of written and
spoken  discourse  and  interaction  (Oakley  and  Hougaard  2008;  Dancygier  and  Sweetser  2005,
2012). 
The theoretical impetus behind this  chapter derives from the theories and methodologies
proposed by the latter of these broad approaches. Following Hougaard and Oakley (2008:1), we
refer to this rather disparate body of cross-disciplinary research as a cognitive theory of  Mental
Spaces and Conceptual Integration (MSCI), As we progress, the nature of conceptual blending will
come to take focal prominence in this theory. However, first of all it is worth elaborating a little
upon the idea of mental spaces as understood by MST and MSCI.
1.1 Mental Spaces
In their most basic characterization, mental spaces are understood as partial assemblies constructed
for the purposes of local understanding and action (Fauconnier 2007: 351). Properly understood,
mental spaces are distinct from linguistic structures but derive their existence and form according to
information communicated by linguistic expressions. Those elements of linguistic expressions that
construct new spaces or shift focus to existing spaces are known as  space builders  (Fauconnier
1985:  17).   In  this  respect,  space  builders  can  take  a  variety  of  grammatical  forms,  such  as
prepositional phrases, adverbials, subject-verb complexes and so forth (Fauconnier 1997: 40).
Fauconnier holds that a linguistic expression taken in and of itself, does not have a meaning,
as  such.  Rather,  it  has  a  meaning  potential which  is  only  resolved  as  a  result  of  contextual,
discourse-specific knowledge. In earlier sections, we saw how Langacker attempts to incorporate
10 A note  on terminology:  the  terms  conceptual  integration and  conceptual  blending tend  to  be  used  somewhat
interchangeably. However, in this work they are understood to designate a 'means and ends' relationship. That is to
say, conceptual integration comes about by way of conceptual blending.
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this  notion into  a  single  CDS by essentially additive means.  MST differs  in  the proposal  of  a
number of separate but internally structure domains linked together by connectors, on the basis of a
number of contextual  and grammatical  clues (1997:  38).  In  this  way,  this  extended concept  of
mental spaces is entirely amenable to the theoretical framework of Cognitive Grammar. While CG
accounts for the internal structure of mental spaces in great detail, MST is essentially pragmatic in
its nature, focusing on how mental spaces interact relative to contextual information. 
To illustrate this, consider the following short excerpt taken againhe Old Man and The Sea.
This excerpt has been chosen for its concision and clarity in elaborating the key points developed in
this and the following sections.
1) He is a great fish and I must convince him, he thought. I must never let him learn his strength nor what 
he could do if he made his run. If I were him I would put in everything now and go until something  
broke. But, thank God, they are not as intelligent as we who kill them; although they are more noble and 
more able.
             Hemingway 1980[1952]: 63
Consider specifically the second sentence of this excerpt. According to MST, the construction If I
were him functions as a space builder which opens a conditional space (M) relative to the discourse
base. This base space (B) contains the elements a and b which designate the 'I' of the narrator and
the fish attached to the line. These base elements are linked by the connector of  identity to those
elements a' and b' in the newly built conditional space (M). In this case, M represents a hypothetical
scenario in which the narrator finds himself in the role of the fish and considers how he would act,
given the benefit of his external knowledge and human cognitive faculties.
The relationship between the Base space (B) and the mental space (M) is shown in Figure 1
below. In this figure, the dotted line is used to show that M is set up relative to and subordinate to B.
The bold lines represent the connectors between the spaces. In this instance, the connector is that of
identity (and are hence marked I). Two things are important to note: firstly, that relevant structure
from the parent space B is carried over to the mental space M; secondly, that the roles filled by a'
and b' are only accessible by reference to the Base.
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Figure 1       Adapted from 1997: 72
This simple illustrative example raises a number of points, the most important of which is
that unlike Langacker's rather narrow conception of the CDS, MST proposes a plurality of spaces.
While each of these spaces is defined relative to the Base, each space can have its own internal
structure, so long as this structure does not cause explicit contradictions. While not overtly stated in
Fauconnier's  argument  at  this  stage,  it  seems  sensible  to  assume that  CG provides  an  explicit
framework for elaborating on these internal structures. On this account, the sentence from exceprt
1)  discussed  above  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  trajector/landmark  configuration,  where  the
profiled trajector is that of the narrator ('I') and the landmark the fish ('him'),
While CG can explain how the narrating 'I' and 'him' are construed in this way, it does not
adequately explain  why. As Fauconnier quite rightly observes, the linguistic expression  in and of
itself carries only potential for meaning. In the above example, the landmark 'him' has the potential
for a number of distinct meanings, depending on the context of the discourse during which it is
uttered. In this way, it must be said that CG and MST represent quite natural counterparts to each
other.  While  CG  can  be  employed  at  the  purely  syntactic  level  to  explain  a  wide  range  of
phenomena,  it  is  necessary  to  turn  to  MST  in  order  to  account  for  higher  level  conceptual
representation and meaning construction.
Another way in which MST can be of added benefit to CG is in its treatment of tense and
mood (modality). In the previous section, we saw how these grammatical categories were integral to
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clausal grounding in English, a process which is simultaneously temporal and epistemic. In this
way,  grounding is  essentially  deictic,  understood  as  relative  rather  than  absolute.  As  discourse
evolves and unfolds, it is necessary for us to mentally keep track of where exactly we 'are', relative
to the Base. As Fauconnier writes:
The thinker, speaker, hearer, discourse participant must keep track of the spaces set up, their content, the
links between them, and the order in which they appear […] Specifically, this means knowing at a given
stage what space is the Base, what space is currently the Viewpoint, from which others will be accessed or
constructed, and what space is the Focus – where meaning is currently being constructed.
     1997: 72
From this, Fauconnier introduces and develops a method of tense interpretation based around the
notion of Time Paths, building upon Dinsmore (1991) and Cutrer (1994). This quite novel approach
derives from the relationship between four basic types of space: Base, Viewpoint, Focus and finally,
Event. These four spaces are taken to be discourse primitives, dynamically assigned as discourse
progresses (1997: 73). For reasons of efficiency, the concept of time paths will not be elaborated
upon here in any detail. Suffice it to say that, despite the rather confusing conflation of terminology
used  for  slightly  different  ends,  Fauconnier's  approach  reduces  in  essence  to  to  CG's  focal
adjustments and construal operations.11 Once more, CG and MST prove to be complimentary in this
regard.
Where MST does differ, is in the way it describes how mental spaces interact and combine
to  form  novel  interpretations  –  both  at  the  level  of  the  sentence  and  at  higher  levels  of
conceptualization. Rather than discourse spaces updating in a strictly additive manner, as proposed
by Langacker, MST allows for a much more intuitive, dynamic, and fundamentally creative form of
meaning construction. It does this by way of conceptual blending.
1.2 Conceptual Integration
The canonical interpretation of Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT) is to be found in Fauconnier
and  Turner  (2002)12.  Blending,  according  to  Fauconnier  and  Turner,  is  to  be  viewed  as  the
interpretative  operation  par  excellence  of  the  human  cognitive  apparatus.  On  this  account,
11 Langacker (2008:50-42) notes the considerable overlap apparent between CG and MSCIT.
12 Mark Turner's website represents a comprehensive archive of MSCIT research over this period – see bibliography.
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conceptual  blending  is  not  only  a  major  constitutive  part  of  linguistic  interpretation,  it  is
fundamentally responsible  for whole swathes of human experience from computer  interfaces to
complex  numbers;  from  sexual  practice  to  college  graduation  ceremonies  (2002:  18-30).  The
proposals of this thesis are rather more modest. However, it will be necessary to expand on some of
the basic claims for CIT, and its governing principles.
CIT is understood to have one overarching goal. Broadly speaking, human beings tend to be
able to perceive and conceptualize those things and processes which are at the human scale. This
tendency shows itself most explicitly in some of the more abstract fields of human thought, such as
the sciences and philosophy. Consider, for example, how often the 'billiard ball' model of interaction
is employed in physics: from the quantum level of atoms 'bouncing off' each other; through to the
movements of the cosmos, in the orbits of planets and movements of galaxies. Similarly, human
scale  objects  form  the  staple  examples  of  the  philosophy  seminar,  as  in  Bertrand  Russell's
discussion of tables in chairs (1964[1912]: 7-16). Therefore, we may say that the overarching goal
of conceptual integration is: 
Achieve Human Scale.
In addition to this, it is worth noting a number of notable sub-goals which comprise the
overarching aim. Specifically, these are:
Compress what is diffuse.
Obtain global insight.
Strengthen vital relations.
Come up with a story.
Go from Many to One.
The most interesting of these sub-goals concerns the nature of vital relations, which builds upon the
idea of connectors in MST. In the example above (Figure 1), we saw how a and b in the Base space
were connected by way of  identity to  a' and  b' in the new possibility space. In this case, identity
functions as a connecting relationship between these two spaces. What we find is that, upon closer
inspection, a certain set of these connecting relationships appear more regularly than others. This
particular subset we call vital relations.
CIT proposes that conceptual integration networks are comprised of outer-space links which
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can be compressed into inner-space relations (2002: 92-93). In the first instance, vital relations are
said to obtain between mental spaces in the network; in the latter, they are within mental spaces in
the network (Turner 2007: 381). A full list of the vital relations utilised in blending are:
Change Analogy
Identity Disanalogy
Time Property
Space Similarity
Cause-Effect Category
Part-Whole Intentionality
Representation Uniqueness
Role
   2002: 101
A detailed elaboration of each of these categories is not possible in this work. Instead the
reader is referred to Fauconnier and Turner (2002) and Turner (2007) for a principled and thorough
exposition. However, a great strength of Fauconnier and Turner's approach to blending lies in the
fact  that  these vital  relations  are  in  many ways intuitive to  all  speakers,  hearers,  thinkers,  and
readers. In many ways, they do not necessarily require much in the way of elaboration.
That having been said, for all the intuitiveness of the vital relations, there are a strict set of
principles under which blending operates. Turner lists these as:
a. Topology Principle: other things being equal, set up the blend and the inputs so that inner-space 
relations in the blend reflect useful topology in the inputs and their outer-space relations.
b. Pattern Completion Principle: other things being equal, complete elements in the blend by using 
existing integrated patterns as additional inputs. Other things being equal, use a completing frame 
that has relations that can be the compressed versions of the important outer-space vital relations 
between the inputs.
c. Integration Principle: achieve an integrated blend.
d. Maximization of Vital Relations Principle: other things being equal, maximize vital relations in the 
network. In particular, maximize the vital relations in the blended space and reflect the in outer- 
space vital relations.
e. Intensification of Vital Relations Principle: other things being equal, intensify vital relations.
f. Web Principle: other things being equal, manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of 
appropriate  connections  to  the  input  spaces  easily  and  without  additional  surveillance  or  
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computation.
g. Unpacking  Principle:  other  things  being  equal,  the  blend  all  by itself  should  prompt  for  the  
reconstruction of the entire network
h. Relevance Principle: other things being equal, an element in the blend should have relevance,  
including relevance for establishing links to other spaces and for running the blend. Conversely, an 
outer-space relation between the inputs that is important for the purpose of the network should  
have a corresponding compression in the blend.
i.      Compression Principle: achieve compressed blended spaces.
    2007: 382
These principles will be discussed in more detail in the following section. For now, it will suffice
for the reader to be aware of their existence.
Figure 2 below represents the archetypal conceptual integration network configuration. Input
spaces  I1 and I2  represent  mental  spaces  as properly defined by MST. Added to this,  the basic
network contains an extra two elements which require further definition – the generic space and the
blended space. The first of these, the generic space, represents those features shared by both I1 and
I2..  In this  way, the generic space is a structurally schematic space of which I1 and I2 represent
elaborated  instances.  Note  the  correlation  here  with  Langacker's  CG conception  of  abstraction
(Chapter 2, 2.3)
Figure 2 2007: 379
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We can see process at work in the extract above from The Old Man and The Sea.  In the
passage in question, the 'old man' considers how he would act if he were the fish and invites us to
draw comparisons. Here, then, we find the old man as input space I1  and input space I2  is the fish.
These spaces are linked at varying degrees by the vital relations of Time, Space, Role, Analogy,
Property,  Intentionality,  and  Uniqueness.  This  sees  to  it  that  we  maximize  and  intensify  the
connection between the spaces. In doing so, the narrator creates a richly structured blended space.
In this blended space, not only does he consider how he would act if he was the fish. Equally, the
fish  itself  is  imbued  with  specifically  human  characteristics  of  intelligence  and  nobility.  This
therefore fulfils the various sub-goals above and the overarching aim of achieving human scale.
What we find in this example is an instance of  emergent structure, that is to say the structure which
inheres in the blended space which is often not directly intended.  This potential for emergent structure is
what sets CIT apart from other models as a powerful tool in the process of meaning construction.
Moreover,  as  with  vital  relations,  emergent  structure  derives  from  a  relatively  small  set  of
processes,  namely  composition,  completion,  and  elaboration  (2002: 48-49).  Composition is  the
process by which extra elements can be carried over from individual input spaces while not being
blended by compression of vital relations. In Figure 1, this is illustrated by the elements of I1 and I2
carried over  to the blended space (dotted lines) but  which are not  connected by a bolded line.
Completion, on the other hand, represents the way in which blends recruit background knowledge
and  structures.  In  this  way,  it  can  be  said  to  operate  'behind  the  scenes'  in  a  blend.  Lastly,
elaboration  treats  blended  spaces  as  simulations  which  we  run  imaginatively.  Elaboration  is
therefore called running the blend.
1.3 Types of integration networks
Essentially, then, the important thing to note is that the blend contains structures not carried
over  directly  from either  of  the  inputs  but  instead  derives  from a  creative,  dynamic  cognitive
process of composition, completion and elaboration. Two final points about conceptual integration
are to be noted. Firstly, that this newly blended space with its emergent structure can serve as the
input space for yet another blend. In this way, the depth of possibility in CIT becomes apparent,
providing  a  structured  explanation  for  widely  divergent,  high-level  conceptualizations.  This
flexibility is not to be found in Langacker's current discourse space.
Secondly, the process described above represents a somewhat idealized model, known as a
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mirror network13, where input spaces, the generic space, and the blended space all share the same
organization structure or frame (2002: 122). In contrast to mirror networks, blends can also occur in
single-scope networks. To quote Fauconnier and Turner:
A single-scope network has two input spaces with different organizing frames, one of which is projected to
organize the blend. Its defining property is that the organizing frame of the blend is an extension of the
organizing frame of one of the inputs but not the other.
          2002: 126  In a
single-scope network, there will be a overt conceptual clash between organizing frames in input
spaces. In the resultant blended space, the organizational schema of one input space will be carried
over. In this way, single-scope networks represent a form of analogical reasoning (Gentner et al
2001). We may say then, that single-scope blending is an integral part of (conceptual metaphor)
construction (Lakoff and Johnson 1980/2003).
In contrast, CIT also accounts for double-scope networks. Similar to the previous example,
double-scope  networks  feature  two  input  spaces  with  often  explicitly  clashing  organizational
frames. However, rather than carrying over the structure of an input space, a double-scope network
includes parts of each input space and also has emergent structure of its own. To quote:
In  such  networks,  both  organizing  frames  make  central  contributions  to  the  blend,  and  their  sharp
differences offer the possibility of rich clashes. Far from blocking the construction of the network, such
classes offer challenges to the imagination; indeed, the resulting blends can be highly creative.
  2002: 131
This potential for blending between clashing spaces represents another great strength of CIT over
Langacker's  comparatively  limited  understanding  of  the  CDS,  particularly  for  the  theory  of
discourse modes currently being developed. Moreover, CIT represents a genuine alternative to DRT
and proposed discourse representation structures. Kamp and Reyle's DRT or Langacker's CDS are
useful  constructions  in  the  study of  pronominal  anaphora  and  referent  tracking.  In  the  former
instance, this is perhaps an unfair criticism because in this respect, DRT does exactly what Kamp
and Reyle set out to do. However, in the case of CG, the notion of a CDS does not go far enough.
Conceptual Integration Theory, though, accounts for these phenomena and many more. In this way,
13 Fauconnier and Turner also discuss simplex networks (2002: 120-121). Simplex networks are representative of the
distinction between CG's types and instances, where the blended space therefore represents a grounded instance of a
type.
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when combined with CG, this represents a holistic view of discourse comprehension. Whereas CG
accounts for linguistic phenomena at the level of the 'sentence', at the level of 'discourse' we must
invoke the constructs of Mental Spaces and Conceptual Integration Theory (MSCIT). In Section 2
below, we shall see how this relates to the notion of discourse modes as previously defined.
What stands out from the discussion to this point, though, is that MSCIT allows for a much
detailed process of meaning construction than can be envisaged in a DRT based approach such as
Smith's.  Within  MSCIT,  a  strictly  additive,  compositional,  and  truth-conditional  approach  to
discourse comprehension is equally as valid. However, by invoking a wider range of vital relations,
double-scope  blending,  and  emergent  structure,  MSCIT  is  able  to  account  for  much  richer
interpretations  of  texts.  This,  I  believe  is  the  central  thrust  of  this  thesis,  in  arguing  for  the
functional properties of discourse modes.  This will  be elaborated more clearly in the following
chapter.
However, a final theoretical point remains. MSCIT proposes a principled set of conditions
for  blending;  a  set  of  vital  relations  which  obtain  over  spaces  in  a  network;  and  means  for
describing the emergent structure of blended spaces. In this way, MSCIT seems to be worryingly
unfalsifiable (Popper 1959/2002). Every mental process seems to be capable of description within
MSCIT,  with enough effort.  It  would seem, in  many ways,  that  for  all  of  its  intuitiveness  and
dynamism, MSCIT represents an unfortunately laissez-faire approach to meaning construction. In
the case of vital relations, for example, one person's similarity may be another's analogy. Similarly,
the  process  of  completion contributes  to  emergent  structure  by  projecting  certain  elements  of
background knowledge into the blended space. This excessive freedom of interpretation is MSCIT's
strongest and weakest aspect. Again, we are left to ask – what background knowledge is projected
into the blended space and, crucially, why?
In order to address these concerns, it is necessary to situate MSCIT within a pragmatic meta-
contextual framework. This thesis proposes that the foundations of this framework are to be found
in Relevance Theory.
2 Relevance Theory
Relevance  Theory  (RT)  developed  by  Sperber  and  Wilson  (1986/1995;  2012)  represents  an
ostensibly cognitive approach to pragmatics. The nature of pragmatics has a somewhat uncertain
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position  in  Cognitive  Linguistics,  particularly  in  relation  to  CG  and  MSCIT (Levinson  1997;
Langacker  2008:  40).  However,  Sperber  and Wilson take as foundational  that  there are  certain
aspects of communication and language that are indisputably pragmatic. They write:
It  is  true  that  a  language  is  a  code  which  pairs  phonetic  and  semantic  representations  of  sentences.
However,  there  is  a  gap  between  the  semantic  representations  of  sentences  and  the  thoughts  actually
communicated by utterances.
      1995: 9
As with Fauconnier and Turner, Sperber and Wilson recognize the fact that utterances in and of
themselves do not have a meaning and instead rather carry meaning potential. 
In every case, the grammar can only help determining the possibilities of interpretation. How the hearer sets
about  narrowing  down  and  choosing  among  these  possibilities  is  a  separate  question.  It  is  one  that
grammarians, but not pragmatists can ignore: an adequate theory of utterance interpretation must answer it.
     1995: 10
While all theories of pragmatics take this as axiomatic, RT develops with a somewhat different
focus. In particular, RT seeks to differentiate itself from Gricean theories of pragmatics (cf Grice
1989) which 'try to describe a failsafe mechanism which, when properly applied and not disrupted
by noise, would guarantee successful communication' (1995: 17). Opposed to this, RT attempts to
show  how  these  mechanisms  are  less  definitive,  instead  showing  how  these  rules  make
communication possible but do not guarantee it.
Sperber and Wilson argue against the conception of mutual knowledge as an absolute (1995:
15-21). Instead, RT focuses on what Sperber and Wilson call  cognitive environments.  Building
upon a similar visual metaphor as that which Langacker uses (Chapter 2, Section 2), they define
cognitive environments as follows:
7) A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of 
representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.
8) A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him
 
   1995: 39
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An individual's cognitive environment is therefore the set of all facts that can be 'seen' at any given
time. Crucial to this definition is that the notion of what is manifest to an individual is weaker than
the notion of what is known (1995: 40). Facts and assumptions can necessarily be manifest in the
cognitive  environments  of  two  or  more  people  –  for  example,  if  those  people  share  physical
environments  and  have  similar  cognitive  abilities  (1995:  41).  This  intersection  of  individual
cognitive  environments  and  mutually  manifest  assumptions  is  called  a  mutual  cognitive
environment. Therefore, the crucial point of RT, according to Sperber and Wilson is as follows:
Human beings somehow manage to communicate in situations where a great deal can be assumed about
what is manifest to others, a lot can be assumed about what is mutually manifest to themselves and others,
but nothing can be assumed to be truly mutually known or assumed.
     1995: 45
Taking  this  as  basic,  Sperber  and  Wilson  propose  that  the  overarching  aim  of  all
communication is that a speaker intends to alter the cognitive environment of her audience and
thereby affect actual thought processes as a result. Based on this, they propose that human cognition
is  relevance-oriented  and  that  as  a  result  'someone  who  knows  an  individual's  cognitive
environment can infer which assumptions he is actually likely to obtain' (1995: 46). Crucial to RT,
then, is Sperber and Wilson's rather technical definition of  relevance  and the related notions of
efficiency and ostension.
2.1 Efficiency, Relevance, Ostension
Employing the conceptual metaphor of THE MIND IS A COMPUTER, Sperber and Wilson argue that
human  beings  are  efficient  information-processing  devices.  Efficiency,  in  this  respect,  can  be
characterized with respect to absolute goals or relative goals. In the former case, efficiency is a
matter of achieving a goal with the minimum resource expenditure; in the latter, efficiency is to be
found  in  balancing  expenditure  and  achievement.  In  addition,  there  are  special  cases  where
efficiency obtains in achieving a goal to the highest degree with fixed expenditure (1995: 46).
Information processing involves a certain degree of cognitive expenditure. All information is
either old or new, relative to the individual's  cognitive environment.  In terms of efficiency, old
information  is  not  worth  processing.  New information  can  be  unconnected  to  anything  in  the
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individual's  cognitive  environment,  in  which  case  the  expenditure  in  processing  outweighs  the
achievement.  Similarly,  new  information  can  be  connected  with  existing  information  in  the
individual's cognitive environment to produce a new set of inferential premises by which yet further
information  can  be  deduced  and  inferred.  New information  which  achieves  this  multiplication
effect, is said to be relevant. Relevance in this way can be further quantified, with information that
prompts a greater multiplication effect being said to have greater relevance (1995: 48). As Sperber
and Wilson write:
Our claim is that human beings automatically aim at the most efficient information processing possible.
This is so whether they are conscious of it or not; in fact, the very diverse and shifting conscious interests
of individuals result from the pursuit of this permanent aim in changing conditions.
     1995: 49
In the setting of a communicative act, verbal or otherwise, an individual seeks to alter the
cognitive  environment  of  their  audience  by  making  manifest  new information.  In  order  to  be
maximally relevant,  a communicative act  must  make manifest  the intention to make something
manifest.  This self-referential act is known is  ostension. To recall the visual metaphor, showing
someone something is a case of ostension (1995: 49). By drawing someone's attention to something,
one ostensibly wishes to communicate that the thing in question is worth the cognitive effort of their
attention. Therefore, the main thesis of RT is that an ostensive act carries with it a guarantee of
relevance which makes manifest the intention behind the ostension (1995: 50).
Therefore,  in  contrast  to  Gricean  pragmatics,  RT reduces  to  an  extremely  small  set  of
motivating principles. If we abstract away from the specifics above, Sperber and Wilson conclude
the following points:
Presumption of optimal relevance
9) The set of assumptions  I which the communicator intends to make manifest to the addressee is  
relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process the ostensive stimulus.
10) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have used to communicate
I.
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Principle of relevance
  
11) Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.
    1995: 158
Having thus defined the basic principles of RT, we turn now to consider how RT relates to CG and
MSCIT.
2.2 Relationship to CG and MSCIT 
While the principles of RT are ostensibly 'cognitive'  in their  basis, it  would seem that a
number of Sperber and Wilson's preliminary theoretical standpoints are opposed to such theories as
CG and MSCIT. For example, Ungerer and Scmid observe the following:
In short, Relevance Theory is clearly positioned ore on the logical-deductive side typical of pragmatic  
work inspired by the philosophical tradition, while Conceptual-Blending Theory has a much richer and 
multi-faceted view of cognition which is, however, also more hazy and intuitive.
  2006: 295
Similarly,  Sperber and Wilson's  use of the conceptual metaphor of  THE MIND IS A COMPUTER
seems fundamentally at odds with Langacker who argues against the idea of a language as a self-
contained or well-defined formal system. He writes further:
I likewise reject the metaphor that likens mind to a digital computer and language to a program that it runs.
CG is more at home in the 'connectionist' ('neural network') world of dynamic systems, parallel processing,
distributed representations, and computation by simultaneous constraint satisfaction.
     2008: 10
Fauconnier and Turner make a similar point (2002: 12). However, this need not be a fatal
incompatibility. Indeed, Sperber and Wilson's conception of mind as computer derives more from a
biologically driven push for efficiency in information-processing systems as opposed to a reductive,
computational model of language. The human mind is a dynamic, open system which constantly
self-monitors  much  more  sensory  information  than  it  is  realistically  possible  to  process
simultaneously. Instead, the mind chooses that information which is most relevant in updating and
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developing the individual's cognitive environment. This proposal represents RT in its purest form,
and is somewhat different to Langacker's strictly algorithmic view of computation.
Moreover, there does exist a considerable degree of overlap in the theoretical foundations of
these approaches. In particular, each theory takes as basic the idea of semantic knowledge being
essentially encyclopaedic. The 'meaning' of lexical units therefore resides less in the dictionary view
of lexical semantics. Langacker terms this encyclopaedic knowledge the conceptual substrate of an
expression, the individual facets of which include:
1) The conceptions evoked or created through the previous discourse.
2) Engagement in the speech event itself, as part of the interlocutors' social interaction.
3) Apprehension of the physical, social, and cultural context.
4) Any domains of knowledge that might prove relevant.
            Adapted from 2008: 42
Similarly, Fauconnier and Turner criticize generative accounts of compositionality such as DRT for
the primacy given to truth-conditional connectors such as identity. As we have seen, identity is only
one member of a set of vital relations which adhere equally across spaces. MSCIT therefore takes a
looser view of compositionality which permits the additional use of contextual knowledge in the
computation of truth conditions. They note:
Specifying the context to the degree that it would specify all the appropriate truth conditions […] would
require specifying the framing of the inputs, the counterparts in the cross-space mapping, the details of the
selective projection,  the degree of  matching typology, and all  the other parts  of the network model of
conceptual integration.
  2002: 163
By comparison, Sperber and Wilson accept the notion of encyclopaedic knowledge, with a minor
addendum.  We  saw  above  that  an  individual's  cognitive  environment  represents  the  set  of  all
information manifest to the individual. Crucially, this manifest information may take the form of
either fact  or  assumption, which Sperber and Wilson roughly correlate as the distinction between
logical and encyclopaedic knowledge. In this way, they write:
Our suggestion is that, broadly speaking, the content of an assumption is constrained by the logical entries
of the concepts it contains, while the context in which it is processed is, at least in part, determined by the
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encyclopaedic entries.
     1995: 89
Sperber and Wilson therefore make a rather radical claim for the complete reversal of the
role of context in meaning construction.  By their  account,  in RT the principle of relevance has
absolute primacy in the order of discourse comprehension. Rather than context being determined
and the relevance of an utterance assessed relative to this, Sperber and Wilson propose that people
assume the relevance of ostensive acts of communication and  then try to select a context which
achieves maximal relevance (1995: 142). Contextual information is therefore added 'after the fact',
as it were.
This view of information processing is considered unrealistic by Werth (1999), who argues
that context is a discoursal phenomenon, 'in which the preceding text is main driver in the creation
and  maintenance  of  context'  (Black  2006:  85).  In  part,  this  criticism seems  to  derive  from a
fundamental – though excessively common – misunderstanding of the role of pragmatics theories as
rigid rule-based systems which in some way limit the possibilities of the individual's cognitive and
linguistic creativity. Hence, Black's observation that, 'it is telling that Sperber and Wilson’s rely on
metaphors deriving from computers and economics to explain the workings of the human mind'
(2006: 101). In the same way, this criticism is perhaps just as telling. 
With  regards  to  the  nature  of  literary  interpretation,  this  point  is  made  succinctly  by
Stockwell (2009), who writes: 
Aside from academic readers who have an eccentric institutionalised predilection for wilfully innovative
readings, the vast majority of natural readers are able to discern a textualised preferred reading and impute
it to their mind-modelled schema of the author's intention.
           2009: 270
Encyclopaedic knowledge varies across speakers and time. Writers and readers may be separated by
vast distances, both concrete and abstract. In this way, it is difficult – if not impossible – for a reader
to  fully share  with  the  writer  the  necessary contextual  information  to  properly ascribe  a  text's
meaning:
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For the displaced situation of most literary reading, the context is minimal, and so the text-drivenness of the
stylistic form is even more essential to the reader's evaluation of a preferred response to the text as a whole
[…] In short, readers assume there is a preferred reading of a literary text, which they impute to the author's
intention.
  2009: 269
This idea of a preferred reading conforms with the expectations of RT. In this way, the multiplicity
of potential readings of a text derives from the reader's attempt to select a context which results in
maximal relevance. Therefore, this thesis proposes to take RT as the meta-contexual framework
within which this approach to text analysis can be properly understood. The remaining sections
intend to illustrate how – taken together – a theoretical synthesis of CG, MSCIT and RT can be
employed in discourse comprehension.  In  particular,  the following chapter  wishes to  show this
syncretic approach allows for discourse modes to be applied fruitfully in the analysis of literary
texts. In this way, what follows is the application of discourse modes to the field of stylistics (cf
Carter and Stockwell 2008; McIntyre and Busse 2010; Stockwell and Whiteley 2014).
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4Spaces and Style:
Applications in Literary Narratives
0 Introduction
The  preceding  chapters  have  contained  a  great  deal  of  theoretical  exposition.  Throughout,  the
emphasis has been on re-situating Carlota Smith's theory of discourse modes within a thoroughly
Cognitive Linguistic approach, with particular reference to Cognitive Grammar (CG).  In doing so,
we saw how the grounding system of English allows for a more detailed level of interpretation than
found within a generative approach such as Discourse Representation Theory. Following this, we
saw how the same lexicogrammatical categories function as space builders in Mental Space and
Conceptual Integration Theory (MSCIT). From this, it may logically be deduced that these mental
spaces are understood as being nearly directly equivalent to Smith's discourse modes. By placing
emphasis  on  viewpoint,  epistemic  access  and  the  dynamic,  inter-subjective  nature  of  meaning
construction, CG and MSCIT greatly increase the descriptive possibilities of discourse modes.
This  thesis  opened  with  the  claim  that  discourse  modes  properly  understood  could  be
thought of as functional units of discourse above the level of the sentence. In order to tentatively
illustrate this proposal, this brief chapter presents some short worked examples of discourse modes
and spaces  in  action in  well-known literary fiction.  The examples  provided are intended to  be
indicative of potential rather than an entirely exhaustive account of future applications.
1 Spaces, Style and Story
The remainder of this thesis seeks to advance the status of discourse modes as conceptually salient,
functional units of discourse above the sentence, at the level of the passage. Chapter 2 showed in
detail how discourse modes as (roughly) envisioned by Smith can be accounted for by the basic
principles of CG. However,  one of the necessary conclusions of this discussion is a marginally
reduced typology of only three discourse modes – Narrative, Description, and Elaboration. Each of
these  modes  is  clearly  delineated  by  slightly  different  clusters  of  specific  lexicogrammatical
properties. As such, the present work argues that these modes are most fruitfully understood as
building discrete mental spaces. By employing the theoretical insights of Cognitive Grammar into
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focal adjustments and construal, the internal structure of these spaces can be described in fine detail.
Building upon this, these spaces combine at the level of discourse by way of conceptual blending.
Finally, all of this takes place under the umbrella of Relevance Theory. So, we say that the three
modes of discourse are properly defined as discourse spaces – that is, Narrative Space, Description
Space, and Elaboration Space. 
This  theory therefore  aligns  itself  squarely alongside  other  models  of  text  interpretation
which involve mental space constructions, such as Text World Theory (Werth 1999; Gavins 2007).
A more direct comparison is to be found in Dancygier (2011), which arrives at similar conclusions
to  this  thesis  by different  means,  proposing  partial  narrative  structures  called  narrative  spaces.
Dancygier’s characterization of a narrative space (2011: 36) is broadly compatible with the theory
being developed here. However, the main exception is that the present work proposes a principled
set of spaces beyond the purely 'narrative' which correspond to distinct linguistic forms. In this way,
the  present  theory attempts  to  bridge  the  gap between the  text-driven approach of  Text  World
Theory and the conceptually focused mental-spaces-and-blending framework.
Despite a number of dissimilarities, this thesis wishes to adopt Dancygier's definition of the
narratological binary of text and story. Specifically, Dancygier argues that story is to be understood
as an emergent property of the text as interpreted by the reader:
A 'story' can thus be discussed as a cognitive construct, a blend, emerging through the process of meaning
construction  triggered  by  reading.  The  role  of  the  text  is  crucial  in  providing  such  prompts,  but  the
emergence of a story relies to a comparable degree on the frames evoked in the reader's mind, and on the
construction of double-scope blends, integrated into the mega-blend.
     2011: 56
The nature of the relationship remains the basis of ongoing debate in literary narrative theory. In
contrast  to  more  traditional  structuralist  narratology  (Barthes  1968;  Genette  1980;  Culler
1975/2000; Todorov 1977), the theory developed here finds closer associations with contemporary
cognitive narratology, particularly in Dancygier's work but also in the work of Fludernik (1996,
2009) and Herman (2002, 2003). However, despite these rather loose family relations, the proposal
in this thesis is considerably more modest. 
While a theory of discourse modes may contribute in a minimal way to the development and
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emergence of story, such a theory will never adequately explain the full gamut of interaction the
reader has when engaging with a text. However, this is not to deny the potential gains of this model
of text analysis. Rather than representing a complete narratological theory, the notion of discourse
spaces most fruitfully represents a new addition to the analytical tool-kit of cognitive stylistics. In
this way, the whole of the theory represents rather much more than the sum of its parts. Consider,
for example,  the stylistic notion of  foregrounding  (cf Emmott and Alexander 2014). Stockwell
(2009:  13-25)  notes  the  obvious  correlation  between  stylistic  foregrounding  and  the  cognitive
phenomenon of figure/ground alignment. In reference to the textual field, foregrounding is achieved
by a  number  of  linguistic  and  literary  devices  such  as  'repetition,  unusual  naming,  innovative
descriptions, creative syntactic ordering, puns, rhyme, alliteration, metrical emphasis, the use of
creative metaphor, and so on' (2009: 14). Adapting the standard metaphor of visual perception, such
stylistic features are said to confer prominence. By conferring prominence on a certain expression,
object, or concept, the text selects certain elements as more deserving of readerly attention (2009:
18). 
As  such,  literary foregrounding is  a  form of  ostensive-inferential  communication  (Clark
2014: 112-119). In relevance-theoretic terms, readers assume that these foregrounded elements are
worth  their  effort  to  process.  In  the  interpretation  of  literary texts,  processing  of  foregrounded
elements is considered favourable due to the likely result of the largest possible number of weak
implicatures (Pilkington 2000). The definition of discourse modes reached at the end of Chapter 2
shows that  – at  a textual level  – discourse modes have noticeably divergent lexicogrammatical
properties. So, we may say that a sudden shift between discourse modes represents an instance of
stylistic foregrounding. The discourse space built by the mode is thus more likely to be projected
into  a  conceptual  integration  network,  contributing  to  the  unfolding  and  development  of  the
emergent  story.  In the same way as sentences,  the emergent  story of a literary text  has only a
meaning  potential,  relative  to  the  context  and  encyclopaedic  knowledge  of  the  reader.  In  the
following sections, a number of these ideas are elaborated upon with reference to a set of literary
texts.  Throughout,  the  emphasis  remains  on  the  practical  possibility  of  discourse  modes  as
functional units of discourse at the level of the passage.
2 'Of Mice and Men'
Arguably Steinbeck's most well-known novel, Of Mice and Men (Steinbeck 2000[1937]) concerns
itself with Steinbeck's most common subject matter – the lives of real people against the backdrop
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of  the  California  boom days  and the  Great  Depression.  The writing  is  rich  in  symbolism and
allegory,  a  full  exposition  of  which  would  take  up  a  thesis  in  and  of  itself  (Goldhurst  1990).
However, the most salient point is that Steinbeck takes pains to highlight the dignity of individuals
trying to live simple lives off the land and sea and of the role of the poor in a society which deprives
them of any power. Shillinglaw writes:
It is a world where personal interaction is marked by instances of petty control, misunderstanding, jealousy,
and  callousness.  The  political  reality  examined  by  Steinbeck  […]  is  the  intense  loneliness  and  anger
engendered by hopelessness.
   2000: xviii
This focus on the theme of loneliness is commonly raised in critical analyses of Of Mice and Men
(Loftis  1990:  43).  In  particular,  Steinbeck  draws  attention  to  the  hopelessness  engendered  by
poverty  by  muting  conflicts  between  those  with  power  and  those  without.  Shillinglaw  writes
further:
Gestures of  political  and social  power  are  diffused  or  checked […] The opening  scene insists  on this
narrowing, as Steinbeck introduces his two traps in a landscape that conveys both their intimacy with nature
and their exclusion from any real power.
     2000: xix
Loftis (1990: 41) further notes the thematic importance of this opening scene, an expanded
excerpt of which is reproduced in Appendix 1. Upon close inspection, we find that this section is
ripe for a  stylistic  analysis  based around discourse modes. The novel opens with the following
passage:
1) A few miles south of Soledad, the Salinas River drops in close to the hillside bank and runs deep
and green. The water is warm too, for it has slipped twinkling over the yellow sands in the sunlight before
reaching the narrow pool. On one side of the river, the golden foothill slopes curve up to the strong and
rocky Gabilan mountains, but on the valley side the water is lined with trees – willows fresh and green with
every spring, carrying in their lower leaf junctures the debris of the winter's flooding; and sycamores with
mottled, white, recumbent limbs and branches that arch over the pool […] 
             2000: 3
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With its characteristic clustering of non-processual complex relationships, we say that this
passage is a canonical instance of the descriptive mode. Incorporating CG terminology, we may also
say that the scene is construed as maximally objective. In this way, the scene is viewed by way of
summary scanning as described in Chapter 2 – as the focus of attention shifts from object to object,
a gestalt image of the entire scene is formed in the mind of the reader. In doing so, the reader
construes the phenomenon of fictive motion (Matlock 2004). When conceiving of movement along
a path, we conceptualize the mover as occupying a successive series of locations which constitute a
path (Langacker 2008: 529). In the apprehension of fictive motion, the same principle is applied to
static scenes by a process of subjectification. Langacker elaborates upon this point:
Through  subjectification,  the  dynamicity  inherent  in  the  apprehension  of  events  is  transferred  to  the
conception of static scenes. A verb like  run, which profiles objectively construed motion by its trajector,
comes  instead  to  designate  a  configuration  apprehended  through  subjectively  construed  motion  (i.e.
sequential mental access) by the conceptualizer.
    2008: 530
This construal of fictive motion is therefore at play in this opening descriptive mode:
2) A few miles south of Soledad, the Salinas River drops in close to the hillside bank and runs deep 
and green. 
3) On one side of the river, the golden foothill slopes  curve up to the strong and rocky Gabilan  
mountain.
               2000: 3
Therefore,  we come to account for Smith's original definition of text progression in descriptive
modes as being 'spatial advancement through the scene or object' (2003: 20). The cinematic quality
of Steinbeck's prose (Swan 1999: 122) is thus given a cognitive explanation. In this instance, the
descriptive  mode  has  the  role  of  'setting  the  scene',  in  layman's  terms.  It  is  perhaps  more
representative to describe it as a  framing device. With the scene thus set, the reader immediately
encounters the following passage: 
4) Evening of a hot day started the little wind to moving among the leaves. The shade climbed up the 
hills toward the top. On the sand banks the rabbits sat as quietly as little gray, sculptured stones. 
And then from the direction of the state highway came the sound of footsteps on crisp sycamore 
leaves.  The rabbits  hurried noiselessly  for cover.  A stilted heron labored up into the air  and  
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pounded down river. For a moment the place was lifeless, and then two men emerged from the path
and came into the opening by the green pool.
      
In contast to the previous passage, this represents a markedly different stylistic quality. In
particular, note how the dominant type of relationship introduced into the discourse is in this case
processual.  Specifically,  these processual  relationships  are  instances  of the  past  perfective  verb
type.  As such,  they represent  bounded clauses  grounded relative  to  the shared discourse space
introduced in the preceeding text. To utilise the terminology employed in the previous chapter, we
therefore say that this passage represents a foregrounded narrative space grounded relative to the
descriptive space it follows.
Loftis notes the connection between the entrance of Lenny and Carl and the tree limb 'worn
smooth by men who have sat on it' (1990: 41). In this way, the text represents a link between the
past  and  the  present.  This  interpretation  follows  quite  readily  from  principles  of  conceptual
blending. In this way, the desciptive space D and the narrative space N are connected by the vital
relations of  Time, Space,  and  Cause-Effect.  Fauconnier and Turner cite an example not entirely
dissimilar to the present instance which is quoted here at length. Consider the relationship between
a fire and the ashes it leaves behind:
It is not enough to see one thing as caused by the other; rather we need two proper mental spaces, the one
with the logs burning and the one with the ashes. These are connected by Vital Relations of Time (one
space is  later than the other),  Space (they are in the same place),  Change (the logs become the ashes
through the transformation of burning), and Cause-Effect (the fire causes the change and the existence of
the ashes). There are subtypes of Cause-Effect. Producer-Produced is one.
     2002: 96
Building upon this Producer-Produced relation, the reader is led to blend the descriptive space and
narrative space into a newly integrated whole, whereby Lenny and Carl stand for the Producer. In
this way, the reader develops a schematic emergent structure in the blended space which relates the
static, scenic quality of the descriptive space with the actions and processes of man – that is to say,
of the relationship between nature and man. 
The shift between descriptive and narrative mode represents an act of stylistic foregrounding
and is thus an act of ostensive-inferential communication. Taking the basic schematic information
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immediately derived from the grammatical and conceptual cues, the reader therefore attempts to
find  a  context  which  achieves  maximal  relevance.  In  practice,  this  may  take  the  form  of  a
theological treatise on post-lapsarian man (Bloom 1999); a Marxian critique of society and capital
(Gibbons 2013); or a feminist criticism of both of these views (Burkhead 2002: 60-62). In all cases,
Steinbeck's  making  manifest  of  the  elements  described  above  is  considered  equivalent  with
authorial  intent.  Therefore,  the  final  interpretation  ultimately  derives  from the  implied  mutual
cognitive environment projected by the reader's encyclopaedic knowledge. 
The present thesis  has nothing directly to add to this final stage of higher-order literary
interpretation, other than to observe a broad affiliation with the notion of transtextuality, i.e. 'all that
sets the text in relationship, whether obvious or concealed, with other texts' (Genette 1992: 83-84).
This  idea of transtextuality therefore inevitably touches on the rather  murky waters of Literary
Theory  and  concepts  of  (post-)structuralism.  However,  a  fully  systematic  account  of  such
relationships would, in many ways, be the holy grail of pragmatic stylistics; the present work is far
more realistic in its limitations. Instead, we now turn our attention to another example of an instance
when the stylistic use of discourse modes augments the reader's understanding of a text.
3 'Everything is Green'
 The text under consideration is an example of flash fiction, a rather loosely defined genre of semi-
constrained writing. Originally envisioned as 'stories that could be read without turning the page'
(Thomas et al 1992: 12), flash fiction is designed to present complete, self-contained stories in a
radically condensed space of usually no more than 750 words. However, as Thomas argues:
Like all fiction that matters, their success depends not on their length but on their depth, their clarity of 
vision, their human significance […] These stories are not tricks, or trills of a flute; rather they are very 
short stage presentations or musical pieces that play to the full range of human sensibilities.
    1992:12
In particular, this section intends to focus on Everything is Green by David Foster Wallace
(Wallace 1989: 227-230). In Appendix 2, I have included a key section of the text under analysis in
this section.. However, at a mere 685 words including title, Wallace's full piece is noticeably short
even for a genre of writing defined by its brevity. Moreover, it is particularly short for those readers
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acquainted with Wallace's body of often wildly experimental, post-modern, 'maximalist prose' (cf
Ercolino 2012). 
Initially  published  in  the  collection  Girl  with  Curious  Hair (Wallace  1989),  the  story
concerns  the  rather  commonplace  theme  of  a  couple  experiencing  difficulties  in  a  romantic
relationship  (Boddy  2013:  23-42;  Boswell  2003:  100-101).  In  contrast  to  Wallace's  typical
maximalism, the prose featured in Girl with Curious Hair – including that of Everything is Green –
is somewhat muted and sedate. Both Boddy and Boswell make the case that this is a deliberate
stylistic  choice  by the  author,  in  order  to  parody the  dominant  'minimalist  prose'  prevalent  in
America during the 1980s. Thus, Boswell writes of Everything is Green:
Though the primary function of the piece is to recapitulate the book's ongoing exploration of interiority 
and exteriority, Wallace also uses this wisp of a story to enact his final critique of the minimalist mode, 
employing the style one more time not as indictment but rather as a vehicle for lyrical transformation.
   2003: 100
These observations are broadly echoed by Boddy, who writes:
In  'Everything  is  Green'  though,  the  main  problem  is  the  difficulty  one  person  has  in  escaping  the
confinement of his own being: 'In me there is needs which you can not even see any more, because there is
too many needs in you that are in the way' (GCH 229). On one level, this sentence reads likes a parody of
monosyllabic minimalism; on another, however, it expresses one of Wallace's most enduring and deeply
felt preoccupations.
         2001: 33
Boswell and Boddy seem to agree then that the 'meaning' of the text comprises two levels.
Firstly, there is the story proper, that of a couple undergoing a period of strife; secondly there is an
inferred  critique  of  minimalist  prose.  This  second  interpretation  employs  a  contextual  element
derived from a knowledge of the history of literary style; the literary milieu of the late 1980s and
early 1990s in American literature; and a knowledge of Wallace's extant body of work as outlined
above. In this case, Everything is Green derives its ultimate meaning as literary fiction qua literary
criticism, typical of Wallace's flamboyantly post-modern writing (see, for example, Letzler 2012
and the essays collected in Boswell 2014).
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What, though, is to be said of the more 'direct' interpretation? At the level of syntax, the
reader is immediately drawn to the disordered nature of the discourse, as clearly illustrated by the
following excerpt:
4) I say Mayfly I can not feel what to do or say or believe you anymore. But there is things I know. I 
know I am older and you are not. And I give to you all I got to give you, with my hands and my 
heart both. 
This disordered speech is an instance of  free indirect discourse. Following Sanders and Redeker
(1999), we may note that this style of discourse allows greater access to the mental state of the
narrator. Following Semino (2002), we refer to this access to mental states as  mind style. In this
way, the reader infers the disordered mental processes of the narrator and views the text from the
narrator's perspective.
From a discourse mode perspective, the text represents a fairly standard alternation between
narrative and expository modes. Each indented change of paragraph is indicative of a change in
mode. This is illustrated in Appendix 2, where regular text represents expository mode and italic
text designates narrative mode. However, consider the following section:
5) Everything is green she says. Look how green it all is Mitch. How can you say the thing you say
you feel like when every thing outside is green like it is.
The window over the sink of my kitchenette is cleaned off from the hard rain last night, and it is
a morning with sun, it is still early, and there is a mess of green out. The trees are green and some grass
out past the speed bumps is green and slicked down. But every thing is not green. The other trailers are
not green, and my card table out with puddles in lines and beers cans and butts floating in the ashtrays
is not green, or my truck, or the gravel of the lot,  or the Big Wheel toy that is on its side under a
clothesline without no clothes on it by the next trailer, where the guy has got him some kids.
Everything is green she is saying. She is whispering it and the whisper is not to me no more I know
         
The bolded section above represents a clear-cut instance of the descriptive mode which stands out in
relief to the surrounding text. As with the descriptive mode in  Of Mice and Men,  the response
generated in the reader is one of panoramic scanning of the whole scene. In this instance, though,
rather than viewing the scene from a purely external vantage point, the reader views the scene from
the internal perspective of the narrator Mitch. In this way, the crucial point which specifically draws
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the reader's attention to this point is primarily stylistic but also inferential. Note how, in the section
directly proceeding the text in descriptive mode, Mayfly observes that, 'Everything is green. From
Mitch's perspective looking out over the same scene, 'every thing is not green'. However, directly
following the descriptive mode, Mitch observes that  Mayfly's  whisper 'is  not to me no more I
know'. Why is this considered important enough to be foregrounded?
Turning to a CG analysis, we find that Langacker develops an argument ideally suited to a
description  of  this  stylistic  discussion.  In  his  discussion  of  the  deictic  strategies  of  nominal
grounding, he writes:
Every  invokes the everyday experience of seeing group members all at once but still perceiving them as
individuals – like the members of a choir or the colors in a box of crayons.  Each reflects the strategy of
examining members sequentially, one by one, until they have all been looked at […] Sequential access has
the consequence that just a single instance is being examined at any one moment.
    2008: 294
By our privileged access to Mitch's mind style, we are able to view the descriptive space the text
invokes  from his perspective.  The internal  structure of this  space is  that of a sequential  list  of
objects, each inspected individually as discrete units. Mayfly's perspective, on the other hand, seems
to invoke a conflicting viewpoint, which sees the entire scene as a gestalt of connected entities.  The
conflict between these vantage points is therefore similar to the distinction between every and each
elaborated by Langacker. 
Finally, let us consider in detail the passages immediately before and after the descriptive
mode. Specifically, consider the following sentences:
6) Everything is green she says.
7) Everything is green she is saying.
Despite their similarity in passing, the difference between these sentences is worthy of elaboration.
For example, 6) profiles an instance of a present perfective. In 7), though, this is converted to an
imperfective process by way of the progressive. In this way, the process profiled has shifted focus –
Mitch's perspective now 'zooms in' on Mayfly. By invoking the progressive, Mayfly's act of saying
is now dynamic, ongoing, and unfolding through time. Thus, Mitch concludes,
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8) She is looking outside, from where she is sitting, and I look at her, and there is something in me 
that can not close up in that looking. Mayfly has a body. And she is my morning. Say her name.
In this case, then, the emergent story derives from the blending of Mitch's perspectivized descriptive
space with information in the minimally constructed narrative and expository spaces that have come
before. By Mitch's recognition of Mayfly's individual existence in relation to his, the vital relations
that adhere across spaces are  Similarity,  Analogy,  and  Intentionality. To invoke the language of
continental philosophy, this is the process of Mitch coming to acknowledge the Other in relation to
himself.
The text of Everything is Green invokes a number of different discourse modes which serve
as purely structural ordering devices. However, the foregrounded use of the descriptive mode opens
up a perspectivized descriptive space which affords the reader at  least  partial  access to Mitch's
revelatory shift of perspective, finally seeing and acknowledging Mayfly as an individual in her
own right. Wallace's story therefore assumes maximal relevance when understood in the context of
Boswell and Boddy's reading, regarding the nature of interiority and exteriority and the difficulty of
escaping oneself. In this case,  Everything is Green represents an instance of a literary engagement
where  the  ethical  dimension  is  highly  salient  and  foregrounded  in  the  preferred  reading,  as
described by Stockwell (2009: 268-271). 
In these first two examples, then, the stylistic foregrounding of the descriptive or narrative
spaces can be thought of as an important factor in interpreting the meanings of the texts or passages.
In the final example, I present an instance where a similar effect is achieved by the foregrounding of
an exposition passage against a narrative.
4 'Nineteen Eighty-Four'
George  Orwell's  Nineteen  Eighty-Four (2000[1949])  is  another  literary  text  where  the  ethical
dimension is prominently foregrounded throughout the text. Orwell's story has come to represent
the  archetypal  dystopian  vision  of  totalitarian  society,  so  much  so  that  a  number  of  its  most
important concepts have entered wider linguistic usage. Particularly well-known examples include
Big Brother, Room 101, and thought crimes. Indeed, a large part of the story concerns the nature of
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language and linguistic usage; particularly the attempt to control and censor language.  Orwell's
views  of  language  are  notoriously  well-known  (Orwell  1946)  and  serve  as  the  foundation  of
Nineteen Eighty-Four.
The particular excerpt this section wishes to focus on is presented in Appendix 3. The climax
of the novel ends with Winston Smith’s resigned submission to the will of Big Brother. Despite a
valiant effort, he is left broken and defeated; having spent his life re-writing history for the Ministry
of  Truth,  Winston  himself  no  longer  even  knows  what  is  true  of  his  own history.  The  novel
ostensibly concludes in the following way:
He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was 
hidden beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from
the loving breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything 
was all right, the struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.
THE END
  
Stylistically,  this  represents  a  fairly  typical  instantiation  of  free  indirect  discourse  as
described above. Loosely defined, we may say that this is an instance of narrative mode, all things
being equal. As before, the text therefore affords us access to the protagonist's mind style – in this
case,  Winston  Smith's  faux-triumphalist  self-overcoming  in  the  name  of  Big  Brother.  This
surrendering of individual agency and autonomy is why – quite rightly – Nineteen Eighty-Four is
read as dystopian.
However,  immediately  following  the  end  of  the  story  proper,  the  reader  encounters  an
extended appendix on the nature of Newspeak. The section begins as follows:
      Appendix
        THE PRINCIPLES OF NEWSPEAK
Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of
Ingsoc, or English Socialism. In the year 1984 there was not as yet anyone who used Newspeak as his sole
means of communication, either in speech or writing. The leading articles in the Times were written in it
but this was a tour de force which could only be carried out by a specialist.
 This represents a marked stylistic shift from the preceding text, and is quite deliberately written in
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the  expository  mode  one  would  expect  from  a  standard  historical  academic  paper.  In  the
terminology of this thesis, then, the appendix opens an expository space where new information is
added which will contribute to the emergent story. 
When we inspect the internal structure of this expository space – particularly with regards to
the preceding narrative space – we notice something rather interesting, specifically with regards to
tense.  Winston  Smith's  story ends  with  the  definitive  past  perfect  verb,  indicating  finality  and
conclusion. However, the Appendix begins:
7) Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and  had been devised to meet the ideological  
needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism.
The grounding of the expository space continues in this way:
8) It was expected that Newspeak would have finally superseded Oldspeak […]
9) It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted
10) The grammar of Newspeak had two outstanding grammatical peculiarities.
 
We see, then, a pattern developing in the unfolding of the new expository space. We observe
by the use of past tense clausal grounding that Newspeak  happened prior to the writing of the
appendix.  Notably,  though,  the  events  and  facts  pertaining  to  Newspeak  are  characterized  as
perfective  processes.  Perfective  processes,  as  such,  are  bounded and  complete.  Moreover,  in  a
number  of  cases  this  grounding  invokes  modal  auxiliaries  and  is  thus  explicitly  epistemically
grounded. Therefore, we see that not only did Newspeak exist in the past relative to the time of the
appendix being written but it now no longer exists relative to the expository space.
In this way, the appendix to Nineteen Eighty-Four does not represent an elaborative addition
by Orwell as author, outside the text. Written, as it were, after the facts of the story, it would be
impossible for the appendix to be written by 'George Orwell'.  Instead, the reader must infer the
existence of a new narratorial voice, writing the history of Newspeak from the vantage point of the
future. Therefore, the exposition space is blended with the reader's existing knowledge of the story
by way of Time, Space, Change, Cause-Effect, and Intentionality to construct a new blended space
where the emergent story results in a striking realization – that the totalitarian system which existed
in the story must eventually be defeated.
On this reading, then, the story of Nineteen Eighty-Four does not end with Winston Smith's
83
resigned  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Big  Brother.  Instead,  it  ends  with  a  rather  banal,  academic
observation:
There were also large quantities of merely utilitarian literature – indispensable technical manuals, and 
the like – that had to be treated in the same way. It was chiefly in order to allow time for the preliminary  
work of translation that the final adoption of Newspeak had been fixed for so late a date as 2050.
   2000: 326
The  reader  of  the  novel  may draw two conclusions  here.  Firstly,  one  might  conclude  that  the
historical revisionism practised by the Ministry of Truth was utterly redundant.  For Orwell,  the
totalitarian systems of Big Brother and the Party were always doomed to fail. In this way, Nineteen
Eighty-Four for all its dystopian view of society, refuses to countenance the fact that Big Brother's
victory  over  Winston  Smith  was  anything  other  than  pyrrhic.  It  is,  therefore,  an  optimistic
conclusion. Alternatively, the detached, academic style of this expository space is noticably lacking
in  terms  of  subjectivity.  The information  presented  is  presented  as  authoritatively unassailable;
historical fact devoid of perspective, ideology, and point of view. However, considering the status of
'facts' in 1984 – and the nature of construal in CG – the critical reader may instead be tempted to
question the veracity of this historical analysis.
While this chapter has been relatively limited in its focus, I believe that the possibilities of
discourse modes have been brought to the fore. It should go without saying that the texts employed
in analysis represent rather idealised cases, where the discourse modes being invoked are clearly
defined and differentiated. Indeed, this may be the only instances where a text-type analysis is even
possible. In the final chapter which follows, we summarise the key points of this thesis, highlighting
any areas which the present author views as requiring further study. 
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Concluding Remarks:
Findings and Further Research
This  thesis  opened on the proposal  that  text  types  can be best  rendered as  functionally salient
features of discourse above the clause. Carlota Smith's theory of discourse modes was singled out as
being  a  particular  fruitful  approach  to  text  types,  based  on its  qualitative  analysis  of  both  the
linguistic and functional properties of the modes in question. Smith's initial claim was that discourse
modes can be most readily characterized by their lexicogrammatical properties. In the first instance,
this  thesis  was concerned with taking these key insights from Smith's  model  and developing a
theory of discourse modes from first principles within a specifically Cognitive Linguistic model.
Instead of directly presuming the functional categorization of the modes developed, as is typical in
traditional rhetorical models, this thesis instead aimed to build a working theory of discourse modes
working from the bottom up.
Chapter  1  presented  a  very  brief  walk-through  of  the  key  features  of  Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT). A full exposition of DRT is not possible in a thesis of this length;
instead,  only a  short  synopsis of the theory was possible.  It  was noted that  Kamp and Reyle's
original work and their later technical elaborations are strong and well-defined approaches to the
formal study of discourse structure and meaning construction. From this short expedition into DRT,
Chapter 1 proceeded to introduce the work of the late Carlota  Smith.  This chapter argued that
Smith's  initial  motivations  are  intuitively  plausible  and  fine-grained  enough  to  provide  an
interesting approach to discourse modes as functional text-types. However, while her DRT approach
is valid in and of itself, it was noted that it one could use Smith's inuitive observations to provide a
more richly varied approach to meaning construction in texts. From here, this thesis set out to argue
that a cognitive-functional approach to discourse modes allows for these modes to have greater
descriptive applicability in the qualitative analysis of discourse.
Chapter 2 developed this by introducing the key features of Cognitive Grammar. Principally,
the focus in Chapter 2 was on developing Langacker's theory in such a way as to account not for the
wide array of construal operations in English but to argue for the existence of structural categories
above the sentence. In this way, the chapter concludes on a proposed model of text types, essentially
derived from first principles. The connection between this model and Smith's is that of a family
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resemblance. The three-way division between Narrative, Descriptive, and Exposition modes derives
ultimately from Smith's qualitative analysis of lexicogramatical clustering. 
The reduced framework put forward may lack the depth of Smith's in terms of structural
description.  What  it  lacks  in  this  respect,  though,  it  reclaims  through  its  distinctly  cognitive
alignment and justification. In Chapter 3, these ideas were further developed by way of Mental
Spaces Theory and the related notions of Conceptual Blending and Integration. The argument in this
chapter reduces to the claim that the specific clustering of linguistic properties means that discourse
modes represent individual discourse spaces, each with their own internal structural organization.
By the process of conceptual blending, these spaces become integrated into a coherent, conceptual
whole.  This  chapter  introduced  vital  relations  and  their  role  in  the  blending  process.  Framing
discourse  modes  in  this  way  thus  presents  the  cognitively-minded  text  analyst  with  a  richly
theoretical framework for explaining how exactly these modes interact, rather than assuming them
to be discrete and separate units.
However, in proposing this approach, a fundamental issue was brought to the fore. Cognitive
Grammar and Mental Spaces theory rely heavily on the schematic nature of language. For all the
theoretical  depth  and  understanding  shown  by  Langacker,  or  Fauconnier  and  Turner,  their
conceptualist approach suffer from a discernible lack of an explicitly defined pragmatic framework
for explaining the contextual nature of meaning construction. This thesis proposes that the most
likely candidate to fill this meta-contextual void is to be found in Sperber and Wilson's Relevance
Theory. Chapter Three thus also includes a brief exposition and synthesis of these linguistic theories
into a preliminary whole. However, the present author believes that the fundamental issue raised is
of concern to the entire Cognitive Linguistic enterprise more generally. A potential way forward
from the  initial  characterization  developed  in  this  thesis  would  be  the  complete  integration  of
Relevance  Theory  and  Cognitive  Linguistics  more  generally  –  specifically  with  regards  to
Cognitive Grammar. 
This thesis ostensibly presents itself as an approach to text types which derives from existing
Cognitive Linguistic theories of language. The primary claim, as outlined above, is that these text
types represent salient, functional sections of discourse at the level of the passage. As such, it was
considered somewhat necessary to substantiate these claims. Chapter 4 presents a very small sample
of short case studies showing potential applications in the study of literary narratives. By reference
in particular  to  the stylistic  nature of  foregrounding as an act  of ostensive communication,  the
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textual analyses developed are indicative of rather simplified instances of an ideal type. A great deal
more work is needed beyond the present work to develop further the ideas introduced in this thesis.
One particularly fruitful way would be to study the role of discourse modes across genres. For
example, are genres defined by the discourse modes from which they are comprised? 
In  including  the  analyses  of  Chapter  4,  the  intention  was  not  to  generate  novel
interpretations of literary texts.  Rather it  was to show how existing readings can use discourse
modes  as  another  way  of  validating  stylistic  claims  and  to  point  in  the  direction  of  further
applications in the field of cognitive stylistics and beyond. It is hoped the concept of discourse
modes and spaces developed by this thesis is rich enough to provide the stylistician with a new
addition to his  or her  arsenal.  By bridging the gap between the sentence and the passage in a
cognitively salient way, this thesis therefore shows the way towards a fully developed framework
linking together the three most important aspects of textual interpretation - the text, the story, and
the reader.
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Appendix 1
Excerpt – 'Of Mice and Men', John Steinbeck
A few miles south of Soledad, the Salinas River drops in close to the hillside bank and runs deep and green. The
water is warm too, for it has slipped twinkling over the yellow sands in the sunlight before reaching the narrow
pool. On one side of the river, the golden foothill slopes curve up to the strong and rocky Gabilan mountains, but
on the valley side the water is lined with trees – willows fresh and green with every spring, carrying in their lower
leaf  junctures  the  debris  of  the  winter's  flooding;  and  sycamores  with  mottled,  white,  recumbent  limbs and
branches that arch over the pool. On the sandy bank under the trees the leaves lie deep and so crisp that a lizard
makes a great skittering if he runs among them. Rabbits come out of the brush to sit on the sand in the evening,
and the damp flats are covered with the night tracks of 'coons, and with the spread pads of dogs from the ranches
and with the split wedge tracks of deer that come to drink in the dark.
There is a path through the willows and among the sycamores a path beaten hard by boys coming down
from the ranches to swim in the deep pool, and beaten hard by tramps who come wearily down from the highway
in the evening to jungle-up near water. In front of the low horizontal limb of a giant sycamore there is an ash pile
made by many fires; the limb is worn smooth by men who have sat on it.
Evening of a hot day started the little wind to moving among the leaves. The shade climbed up the hills
toward the top. On the sand banks the rabbits sat as quietly as little gray, sculptured stones. And then from the
direction  of  the  state  highway  came  the  sound  of  footsteps  on  crisp  sycamore  leaves.  The  rabbits  hurried
noiselessly for cover. A stilted heron labored up into the air and pounded down river. For a moment the place was
lifeless, and then two men emerged from the path and came into the opening by the green pool.
They had walked in single file down the path, and even in the open one stayed behind the other.
[…]
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Appendix 2
'Everything is Green', David Foster Wallace
[…] 
Her hair is up with a barrette and pins and her chin is in her hand, it's early, she looks like she is dreaming out
at the clean light through the wet window over my sofa lounger.
Everything is green she says. Look how green it all is Mitch. How can you say the thing you say you feel like
when every thing outside is green like it is.
The window over the sink of my kitchenette is cleaned off from the hard rain last night, and it is a morning
with sun, it is still early, and there is a mess of green out. The trees are green and some grass out past the speed
bumps is green and slicked down. But every thing is not green. The other trailers are not green, and my card table
out with puddles in lines and beers cans and butts floating in the ashtrays is not green, or my truck, or the gravel
of the lot, or the Big Wheel toy that is on its side under a clothesline without no clothes on it by the next trailer,
where the guy has got him some kids.
Everything is green she is saying. She is whispering it and the whisper is not to me no more I know.
I chuck my smoke and turn hard from the morning outside with the taste of something true in my mouth. I turn
hard toward her in the light on the sofa lounger.
She is looking outside, from where she is sitting, and I look at her, and there is something in me that can not
close up in that looking. Mayfly has a body. And she is my morning. Say her name.
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Appendix 3
Excerpt – '1984', George Orwell
[…]
He gazed up at the enormous face. Forty years it had taken him to learn what kind of smile was hidden
beneath the dark moustache. O cruel, needless misunderstanding! O stubborn, self-willed exile from the loving
breast! Two gin-scented tears trickled down the sides of his nose. But it was all right, everything was all right, the
struggle was finished. He had won the victory over himself. He loved Big Brother.
THE END
 Appendix
        THE PRINCIPLES OF NEWSPEAK
Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of
Ingsoc, or English Socialism. In the year 1984 there was not as yet anyone who used Newspeak as his sole means
of communication, either in speech or writing. The leading articles in the Times were written in it but this was a
tour de force which could only be carried out by a specialist.
[…] 
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